Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Bank of America Halts Foreclosure Sales

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Published: October 8, 2010

WASHINGTON (AP) — Bank of America, the nation’s largest bank, said [on October 8, 2010] that it would stop sales of foreclosed homes in all 50 states as it reviews potential flaws in foreclosure documents.

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· Bank of America Corp
· JPMorgan Chase & Co
· PNC Financial Services Group Inc

A week earlier, the company had said it would only stop such sales in the 23 states where foreclosures must be approved by a judge.

The move comes amid evidence that mortgage company employees or their lawyers signed documents in foreclosure cases without verifying the information in them.

“We will stop foreclosure sales until our assessment has been satisfactorily completed,” a company spokesman, Dan Frahm, said in a statement. “Our ongoing assessment shows the basis for our past foreclosure decisions is accurate.”

Concern is growing that mortgage lenders have been evicting homeowners using flawed court papers. State and federal officials have been ramping up pressure on the mortgage industry over worries about potential legal violations.

On [October 7, 2010], the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid, Democrat of Nevada, urged five large mortgage lenders to suspend foreclosures in Nevada until they have set up systems to make sure homeowners aren’t “improperly directed into foreclosure proceedings.” Nevada is not among the states where banks had suspended foreclosures.

The Bank of America announcement came as PNC Financial Services Group said it was halting most foreclosures and evictions in 23 states for a month so it can review whether documents it submitted to courts complied with state laws. An official at the Pittsburgh-based bank confirmed the decision on [October 8, 2010], which was reported earlier by The New York Times. The official requested anonymity because the decision has not been publicly announced.

PNC becomes the fourth major United States lender to halt some foreclosures amid evidence that mortgage company employees or their lawyers signed documents in foreclosure cases without verifying the information in them.

In addition to PNC and Bank of America, Ally Financial’s GMAC Mortgage unit and JPMorgan Chase have announced similar moves in the past two weeks.

In some states, lenders can foreclose quickly on delinquent mortgage borrowers. By contrast, the 23 states use a lengthy court process. They require documents to verify information on the mortgage, including who owns it.



NY to Hold Lawyers Accountable on Foreclosures

NEW YORK (AP) — The chief judge of New York's courts implemented a new rule Wednesday requiring every lawyer handling a foreclosure to sign a form verifying that all paperwork in the case is accurate.

The move comes amid an uproar over accusations that mortgage lenders nationwide cut corners on paperwork and legal procedure as they moved to seize millions of homes. It follows a slew of other state efforts to challenge the foreclosure debacle.

Attorneys general in all 50 states and the District of Columbia are jointly investigating whether mortgage companies have violated state laws. In Maryland, an emergency measure approved this week by the state's highest court outlines how state judges can review foreclosures and stop them if documents are invalid.

In New York, attorneys already have an obligation to ensure that the documents they present to the court are valid, but New York Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman said having them sign something affirming that all papers got a proper review will hold them accountable like never before.

"We want to make sure that everyone is focusing like a laser on these particular types of proceedings," he said. "It puts them on notice. That's what this is all about. We all have to make doubly sure that we are doing what we should be doing in the first place."

The rule requiring a signed affirmation applies to both new cases and the 78,000 foreclosure actions already under way in New York courts.

Lawyers handling pending foreclosure actions will probably need to go back to their clients and verify that all proper steps were followed, Lippman said. The form created by the court requires the lawyers to give the name of the bank employee who affirmed that the records were accurate and the date the conversation took place.

The president of the New York State Bar Association, Stephen Younger, issued a statement praising the new rule. "The chief judge has taken swift steps to address a nationwide problem in foreclosure actions," he said.

Some New York judges have complained loudly about rampant errors of varying severity in legal filings by banks seeking to foreclose on record numbers of homeowners.

In some cases, documents that were supposed to have been given an individualized review were signed by bank employees who never read them or checked them for errors.

A few major banks froze all foreclosures nationwide while they reviewed their filings for problems. Two of the biggest, Bank of America and GMAC Mortgage, resumed proceedings this week.

Lippman said he was convinced the courts were seeing "systemic structural failings" in the foreclosure process, and he said judges and lawyers have a responsibility not to close their eyes to paperwork errors — even if they seem minor.

"You are talking about tremendous consequences. You are talking about taking people's homes," he said. "Those papers have to be accurate. They have to be credible."

Bank of America Finds Foreclosure Errors

By MELLY ALAZRAKI


Bank of America (BAC), for the first time, acknowledged it has uncovered some mistakes in its foreclosure files, The Wall Street Journal reported, as it starts to resubmit documents in 102,000 cases.

The nation's largest mortgage lender discovered errors in 10 to 25 of the first several hundred foreclosure cases it examined over the past week. The mistakes ranged from improper paperwork to lack of signatures and missing files, as well as information irregularities about the properties or payment history, people familiar with the results told the Journal. The bank has prepared less than 1% of the first foreclosure files that it plans to submit.

Some of the problems found so far were relatively minor -- such as misspellings of borrowers' names -- and didn't result in wrongful foreclosures, the bank found.

All 50 states have recently launched investigations into allegations of improper foreclosure filings and procedures, including the use of "robo-signers." Bank of America, Wells Fargo (WFC) and others have been under pressure to show that their mortgage process isn't flawed.

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

The Foreclosure Crisis: Eroding Trust -- and Ending the Recovery?

  Posted 11:01 AM 10/11/10


Though just about everyone has heard about the scandal over "robo-signing" of foreclosure documents, the issues are so complex that what's at stake isn't always clear. After reading dozens of news accounts, editorials and the most widely followed financial blogs, I've assembled a basic account of the scandal -- and outlined five of its potential implications.

1. That homeowners who failed to pay their mortgages will lose their homes through the foreclosure process is not the primary issue. What's at stake is due process of law.

2. The issue isn't just about a minor "technical procedure," as the banks and mortgage-servicing industry are claiming. Boiled down to its essence, the problem is simple: If an individual citizen did what the banking/mortgage-service industry has done, that is, forge signatures and ignore procedures designed to protect property rights, then the documents would be rejected and the individual would be accused of fraud or embezzlement.

Yet, when banks and mortgage servicers break these same laws, it gets brushed aside as a trivial "oops, we forgot to dot the i" technicality. This flouting of the law by politically powerful banks undermines one of the key tenets of the American way, which is that we're all equal before the law.

The systemic flouting of the law that has been uncovered points to a disturbing conclusion: Two systems of law are operating in our nation, one for "the little guy" and one for banks and mortgage servicers.


Accounts of abuse, ignoring procedural law and gross incompetence are now legion. For instance, one Florida homeowner who didn't even have a mortgage was foreclosed by Bank of America (BAC). Only after a local newspaper began investigating the case did the bank move to sort out what could be viewed as an illegal "taking" of real property.

In another case, Deutsche Bank National Trust filed to foreclose even though it had sold the mortgage to Goldman Sachs, meaning it had no legal right to foreclose. One judge found that roughly half (46 out of 104) of the foreclosure motions filed in his court were so full of errors that he refused to approve them.

Many commentators have already dismantled the bank/mortgage servicers' claims that the legal issues are all just trivial technicalities. It's hardly trivial that documents filed in court are the foundation of our legal system. A signed affidavit is legally equivalent to providing live testimony in court. If an affidavit is untrue, that's the same as lying in court, which is a crime called perjury.

Yet the current system is filled with "robo-signers" who electronically signed up to 10,000 foreclosure filing a month, making a legal claim of their accuracy. Furthermore, though attorneys are prohibited from making a material misrepresentation to the court, it's clear that such misrepresentations of fact (such as who actually owns the mortgage) are widespread in foreclosure proceedings.

3. The system of slicing up mortgages into pieces and then bundling the pieces into securities is structurally flawed.

In essence, the widespread "packaging" of hundreds of mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) marketed by Wall Street investment banks has bypassed the property rights laws that underpin ownership and transfer of home loans and deeds.

In the pre-MBS days, a bank would originate a home mortgage and then hold the loan as an asset, collecting the interest and principal payments from the homeowner. But Wall Street banks divided the payments that go toward interest and loan principal into "tranches," or slices, which were assembled by risk and rate of return into pools of mortgages that were then sold as a single security.

With the mortgages divided into pieces that were then bundled into securities that were bought and sold numerous times, the ownership of the underlying mortgage and home often became muddled. This is how two different companies can end up filing foreclosure documents on the same house.

Add in the large number of securitized home equity loans that piggyback on first mortgages and derivative securities such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and you get a nightmarish mishmash of "senior tranches" and multiple claims on the same property.

Stripped of complexity, the issue is straightforward: Every time these securities changed hands, the various claims on the underlying house should have been transferred as well. In many cases, they weren't. In some cases, foreclosures have been allowed even when the original mortgage has been lost.

If you don't need the original document to take someone's home, then exactly what rule of law is at work in America?

4. The nation's system for recording mortgages is woefully inadequate to the task of tracking home loans that have been sliced and diced into tranches and traded freely as securities.

To enable a smooth trading system of these MBS, the banking/mortgage industry set up a privately owned loan-tracking service known as the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) in 1997. The registry acts a sort of legal proxy of ownership, thereby eliminating the need to record changes in property ownership in the traditional manner, i.e. in local land records.

MERS records loan assignments electronically. It doesn't own the mortgages it registeres, but it's listed in public records as a nominee for the actual owner of the loan or as the original mortgage holder.

Assigning ownership of mortgages to this registry saved the industry a bundle. MERS was estimated to have saved the mortgage industry an $1 billion in its first decade of existence. Some 60 million loans are registered to MERS.

5. Outright foreclosure fraud is now systemic. This includes forged signatures, falsified mortgage numbers, false claims of ownership, false claims that the paperwork has been properly reviewed and document fabrication.

Indeed, for a price, you can have any missing document you might need to file a foreclosure motion "recreated" or "created" out of thin air.

Now that this systemic reliance on falsified documents, forged signatures and myriad "shortcuts" (such as not having the original mortgage) has been revealed, several lenders have halted foreclosures and evictions. Some have stopped proceedings in the 23 states that require a judge's approval, while others such as Bank of America have halted foreclosures in all 50 states.

In response to a public outcry about these widespread abuses, the attorneys general of 40 states are pooling resources to investigate the mortgage and foreclosure industries. One state AG has already filed suit against a leading mortgage servicer, alleging fraud in foreclosures processed by the firm. Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray said the fraud was the "tip of an iceberg of industrywide abuse of the foreclosure process" and is asking for civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation of consumer laws.

Freezing the U.S. Real Estate Market

This systemic breakdown of the procedural laws intended to protect property rights may well have far-reaching consequences beyond lawsuits by public agencies and by individuals who have been harmed or defrauded.

Flawed foreclosure documents mean sales of foreclosed home are in limbo: How can any future owner obtain title insurance when the ownership of the mortgage and thus the integrity of the foreclosure itself is in question?

If millions of foreclosed homes cannot be sold with unambiguously clear titles, then that will effectively freeze a significant portion of the American real estate market. After all, about a third of all home sales involve residences in default or foreclosure.

Fannie Mae has been pulling foreclosed homes off the market, scotching signed deals and removing properties from inventory of unsold homes. Homeowners already in the foreclosure process are now wondering if the foreclosure-fraud debacle can delay or even cancel their impending eviction.

Indeed, the widespread fraud and blatant flouting of the law by politically powerful lenders is eroding many Americans' belief in the fairness of the financial and legal systems. As a result, some are asking why they should continue following the rules when lenders and mortgage servicers evade and abuse the law with impunity.

How Does the U.S. Solve Its Real Estate Crisis?

Stories about middle-class homeowners ensnared in what's either fraud or misrepresentation, depending on one's interpretation, now include a troubling subtext: Some of these once rock-solid citizens are refusing to comply with the demands of lenders.

Some high-visibility commentators are characterizing the foreclosure and MBS debacle as "the biggest fraud in the history of the capital markets." Hyperbole, or simply the truth few dare to state?

While that can be debated, what cannot be debated is the massive loss of trust in the foundations of property rights and rule of law that has occurred. Also not debatable is the impact this loss of trust is having on the housing market, large sections of which are effectively locked.

If distressed mortgages cannot be foreclosed and impaired debts can't be liquidated via auctions or sales on the open market, then how does the U.S. unburden itself of the overhang of housing supply and uncollectible mortgages? It cannot do so with this cloud hanging over the housing and mortgage markets. That will have serious consequences for banks that aren't collecting mortgage payments, for servicers facing massive lawsuits and, eventually, for the value of housing in a market stuffed with a "shadow inventory" of distressed or defaulted homes that can't be sold.

Could the foreclosure mess end up stalling the economic recovery? Perhaps the answer can be found by rephrasing the question: How can an economy be healthy if its mortgage, banking and housing markets are in a state of profound financial and legal disruption?


Monday, October 4, 2010

Flawed Paperwork Aggravates a Foreclosure Crisis

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON
Published: October 3, 2010

As some of the nation’s largest lenders have conceded that their foreclosure procedures might have been improperly handled, lawsuits have revealed myriad missteps in crucial documents.

The flawed practices that GMAC Mortgage, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America have recently begun investigating are so prevalent, lawyers and legal experts say, that additional lenders and loan servicers are likely to halt foreclosure proceedings and may have to reconsider past evictions. 

Problems emerging in courts across the nation are varied but all involve documents that must be submitted before foreclosures can proceed legally. Homeowners, lawyers and analysts have been citing such problems for the last few years, but it appears to have reached such intensity recently that banks are beginning to re-examine whether all of the foreclosure papers were prepared properly. 

In some cases, documents have been signed by employees who say they have not verified crucial information like amounts owed by borrowers. Other problems involve questionable legal notarization of documents, in which, for example, the notarizations predate the actual preparation of documents — suggesting that signatures were never actually reviewed by a notary. 

Other problems occurred when notarizations took place so far from where the documents were signed that it was highly unlikely that the notaries witnessed the signings, as the law requires. 

On still other important documents, a single official’s name is signed in such radically different ways that some appear to be forgeries. Additional problems have emerged when multiple banks have all argued that they have the right to foreclose on the same property, a result of a murky trail of documentation and ownership. 

There is no doubt that the enormous increase in foreclosures in recent years has strained the resources of lenders and their legal representatives, creating challenges that any institution might find overwhelming.  According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, the percentage of loans that were delinquent by 90 days or more stood at 9.5 percent in the first quarter of 2010, up from 4 percent in the same period of 2008. 

But analysts say that the wave of defaults still does not excuse lenders’ failures to meet their legal obligations before trying to remove defaulting borrowers from their homes. 

“It reflects the hubris that as long as the money was going through the pipeline, these companies didn’t really have to make sure the documents were in order,” said Kathleen C. Engel, dean for intellectual life at Suffolk University Law School and an expert in mortgage law. “Suddenly they have a lot at stake, and playing fast and loose is going to be more costly than it was in the past.” 

Attorneys general in at least six states, including Massachusetts, Iowa, Florida and Illinois, are investigating improper foreclosure practices. Last week, Jennifer Brunner, the secretary of state of Ohio, referred examples of what her office considers possible notary abuse by Chase Home Mortgage to federal prosecutors for investigation. 

The implications are not yet clear for borrowers who have been evicted from their homes as a result of improper filings. But legal experts say that courts may impose sanctions on lenders or their representatives or may force banks to pay borrowers’ legal costs in these cases. 

Judges may dismiss the foreclosures altogether, barring lenders from refiling and awarding the home to the borrower. That would create a loss for the lender or investor holding the note underlying the property. Almost certainly, lawyers say, lawsuits on behalf of borrowers will multiply. 

In Florida, problems with foreclosure cases are especially acute. A recent sample of foreclosure cases in the 12th Judicial Circuit of Florida showed that 20 percent of those set for summary judgment involved deficient documents, according to chief judge Lee E. Haworth. 

“We have sent repeated notices to law firms saying, ‘You are not following the rules, and if you don’t clean up your act, we are going to impose sanctions on you,’ ” Mr. Haworth said in an interview. “They say, ‘We’ll fix it, we’ll fix it, we’ll fix it.’ But they don’t.” 

As a result, Mr. Haworth said, on Sept. 17, Harry Rapkin, a judge overseeing foreclosures in the district, dismissed 61 foreclosure cases. The plaintiffs can refile but they need to pay new filing fees, Mr. Haworth said.

The byzantine mortgage securitization process that helped inflate the housing bubble allowed home loans to change hands so many times before they were eventually pooled and sold to investors that it is now extremely difficult to track exactly which lenders have claims to a home.

Many lenders or loan servicers that begin the foreclosure process after a borrower defaults do not produce documentation proving that they have the legal right to foreclosure, known as standing. 

As a substitute, the banks usually present affidavits attesting to ownership of the note signed by an employee of a legal services firm acting as an agent for the lender or loan servicer. Such affidavits allow foreclosures to proceed, but because they are often dubiously prepared, many questions have arisen about their validity. 

Although lawyers for troubled borrowers have contended for years that banks in many cases have not properly documented their rights to foreclose, the issue erupted in mid-September when GMAC said it was halting foreclosure proceedings in 23 states because of problems with its legal practices. The move by GMAC followed testimony by an employee who signed affidavits for the lender; he said that he executed 400 of them each day without reading them or verifying that the information in them was correct. 

JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America followed with similar announcements. 

But these three large lenders are not the only companies employing people who have failed to verify crucial aspects of a foreclosure case, court documents show. 

Last May, Herman John Kennerty, a loan administration manager in the default document group of Wells Fargo Mortgage, testified to lawyers representing a troubled borrower that he typically signed 50 to 150 foreclosure documents a day. In that case, in King County Superior Court in Seattle, he also stated that he did not independently verify the information to which he was attesting. 

Wells Fargo did not respond to requests for comment. 

In other cases, judges are finding that banks’ claims of standing in a foreclosure case can conflict with other evidence. 

Last Thursday, Paul F. Isaacs, a judge in Bourbon County Circuit Court in Kentucky, reversed a ruling he had made in August giving Bank of New York Mellon the right to foreclose on a couple’s home. According to court filings, Mr. Isaacs had relied on the bank’s documentation that it said showed it held the note underlying the property in a trust. But after the borrowers supplied evidence indicating that the note may in fact reside in a different trust, the judge reversed himself. The court will revisit the matter soon.
Bank of New York said it was reviewing the ruling and could not comment. 

Another problematic case involves a foreclosure action taken by Deutsche Bank against a borrower in the Bronx in New York. The bank says it has the right to foreclose because the mortgage was assigned to it on Oct. 15, 2009. 

But according to court filings made by David B. Shaev, a lawyer at Shaev & Fleischman who represents the borrower, the assignment to Deutsche Bank is riddled with problems. First, the company that Deutsche said had assigned it the mortgage, the Sand Canyon Corporation, no longer had any rights to the underlying property when the transfer was supposed to have occurred. 

Additional questions have arisen over the signature verifying an assignment of the mortgage. Court documents show that Tywanna Thomas, assistant vice president of American Home Mortgage Servicing, assigned the mortgage from Sand Canyon to Deutsche Bank in October 2009. On assignments of mortgages in other cases, Ms. Thomas’s signatures differ so wildly that it appears that three people signed the documents using Ms. Thomas’s name. 

Given the differences in the signatures, Mr. Shaev filed court papers last July contending that the assignment is a sham, “prepared to create an appearance of a creditor as a real party in interest/standing, when in fact it is likely that the chain of title required in these matters was not performed, lost or both.” 

Mr. Shaev also asked the judge overseeing the case, Shelley C. Chapman, to order Ms. Thomas to appear to answer questions the lawyer has raised. 

John Gallagher, a spokesman for Deutsche Bank, which is trustee for the securitization that holds the note in this case, said companies servicing mortgage loans engaged the law firms that oversee foreclosure proceedings. “Loan servicers are obligated to adhere to all legal requirements,” he said, “and Deutsche Bank, as trustee, has consistently informed servicers that they are required to execute these actions in a proper and timely manner.” 

Reached by phone on Saturday, Ms. Thomas declined to comment. 

The United States Trustee, a unit of the Justice Department, is also weighing in on dubious court documents filed by lenders. Last January, it supported a request by Silvia Nuer, a borrower in foreclosure in the Bronx, for sanctions against JPMorgan Chase. 

In testimony, a lawyer for Chase conceded that a law firm that had previously represented the bank, the Steven J. Baum firm of Buffalo, had filed inaccurate documents as it sought to take over the property from Ms. Nuer. 

The Chase lawyer told a judge last January that his predecessors had combed through the chain of title on the property and could not find a proper assignment. The firm found “something didn’t happen that needed to be fixed,” he explained, and then, according to court documents, it prepared inaccurate documents to fill in the gaps. 

The Baum firm did not return calls to comment. 

A lawyer for the United States Trustee said that the Nuer case “does not represent an isolated example of misconduct by Chase in the Southern District of New York.” 

Chase declined to comment. 

“The servicers have it in their control to get the right documents and do this properly, but it is so much cheaper to run it through a foreclosure mill,” said Linda M. Tirelli, a lawyer in White Plains who represents Ms. Nuer in the case against Chase. “This is not about getting a free house for my client. It’s about a level playing field. If I submitted false documents like this to the court, I’d have my license handed to me.”

Company Stops Insuring Titles in Chase Foreclosures

 The company, Old Republic National Title Insurance, told its agents Friday that it would not write policies on foreclosed Chase properties until “the objectionable issues have been resolved,” according to a memorandum sent out by the firm’s underwriting department.
A Chase spokesman declined to comment. Old Republic executives did not return calls for comment. The title insurer, which is based in Minneapolis, said earlier in the week that it would not write policies for properties that had been foreclosed by another big lender, GMAC Mortgage.
As GMAC and Chase try to deal with questions over their legal methods, they have halted all foreclosures in the 23 states where they need a court’s approval. Late Friday, Bank of America said it would stop all its pending foreclosures in those states as well.
GMAC and Bank of America have declined to say how many cases are involved. Chase said it was halting 56,000 cases. About two million households in the country are in foreclosure, and millions more are on the verge.
After a lender seizes a home in a foreclosure case and the defaulting homeowner is, if necessary, evicted, the company works with local real estate agents to prepare the house for sale. The National Association of Realtors said distressed sales, including foreclosures, were 34 percent of all existing home sales in August. In some stricken areas, the percentage is much higher.
When foreclosures are done with faulty documentation, that could leave the new owners of the house vulnerable to claims. Title insurance protects the buyer against defects, errors or omissions in the chain of title.
Old Republic said in the memorandum that its agents were already reporting written cancellations of contracts involving both Chase and GMAC.
Shares of the major title insurance companies dropped on Friday amid concern that their business would suffer as a result of the foreclosure freezes. Fidelity National Financial fell more than 4 percent, while First American Financial dropped 3 percent.
Fidelity National issued a statement saying it did not believe the problems with the foreclosure process would have “a material adverse impact.”
Mark P. Stopa, a lawyer in Florida who represents defaulting homeowners, said that if more title insurance firms began to shy away from insuring foreclosed properties, the entire housing market could suffer. The prices of foreclosures would plummet, because lenders will not issue a new mortgage without title insurance.
“Judges have to force banks to do foreclosures correctly,” Mr. Stopa said. But that would require a significant increase in staff, he said, and “I’ll believe it when I see it.”

Robo-Signing: Documents Show Citi and Wells Also Committed Foreclosure Fraud

Posted 10:00 AM 10/02/10

Documents submitted to a court are supposed to be true as submitted. As an attorney, if I file with a court a document in which I swore that I personally verified the information contained within the document is true, but I didn't actually do that, I'd get in real trouble. It's simple: That's fraud in the eyes of the court.

GMAC, JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Bank of America (BAC) and One West Bank employees routinely sign hundreds of documents without verifying what they're signing. Those documents are then submitted to courts as if the documents were true, to enable the banks to foreclose on delinquent properties. Wells Fargo (WFC) and Citigroup's (C) CitiMortgage told The New York Times their employees do not engage in similar practices. Yet, new evidence I've found shows they have. At deadline, I was still awaiting a response from CitMortgage.

Confusion at Wells Fargo

For example, in one case I reviewed, Herman John Kennerty of Wells Fargo gave a deposition describing the department he oversees for Wells Fargo. It's a department dedicated to simply signing documents. Kennerty testified that he signs 50 to 150 documents a day, verifying only the date on each. Although the foreclosure in that case was upheld, Wells Fargo did not dispute Kennerty's signing practices.

What else might Kennerty want to verify? Well, in one document he signed that I've reviewed, he supposedly transferred the mortgage from Washington Mutual Bank FA to Wells Fargo on July 12, 2010. But that's impossible because Washington Mutual Bank FA changed its name in 2004, and by any name WaMu ceased to exist in 2008, when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. took it over. Making the document even less comprehensible, the debtor had declared bankruptcy a month earlier, according to consumer bankruptcy attorney Linda Tirelli, who represents the debtor. Why would Wells Fargo want a mortgage from someone in bankruptcy?

Finally, Tirelli points out that the papers Wells Fargo filed included a different transfer of the mortgage dated three days before the debtor took out the loan. The documents are a mess, yet Kennerty signed them regardless. Wells Fargo flatly stands behind its practices:
"Wells Fargo policies, procedures and practices satisfy us that the affidavits we sign are accurate. We audit, monitor and review our affidavits under controlled standards on a daily basis. We will stand by our affidavits and, if we find an error, we will take the appropriate corrective action.
As a standard business practice we continually review, reinforce and strengthen our policies and procedures."
Wells offered no explanation of the document Kennerty signed in Tirelli's case.

Legal Nonsense at CitiMortgage

In a similar example, one M. Matthews signed a number of documents that CitiMortgage has used to try to foreclose on properties. While Matthews may or may not sign hundreds of documents a day -- I have not yet found a deposition in which he swears that he does -- he certainly does not seem to verify the contents of the documents he's signing.

For example, he signed a document supposedly transferring a mortgage from Lehman Brothers to Citi in 2009. It's hard to see how that's possible because Lehman had already ceased to exist. When confronted with its nonsensical filing, Citigroup decided not to foreclose. Instead, it gave the homeowner a meaningful mortgage modification -- $15,000 principal reduction, plus a 30-year fixed mortgage at 3%. Tirelli, who represented the debtor in this case, too, notes that she sees bad documents in the vast majority of cases, and she keeps files of "robo-signed" documents.

I want to note that in both the WaMu and Lehman Brothers documents, the signers were officially representing an entity called MERS, which was acting as the "nominee" of WaMu and the "nominee" of Lehman Brothers. But that doesn't change the problems with the documents as filed. MERS can't continue to be the nominee of an entity that doesn't exist. Moreover, MERS can't assign something it doesn't have, and MERS itself doesn't own the underlying note or mortgage.

Wells Fargo and CitiMortgage aren't the only big banks to apparently misrepresent their practices in the media. JPMorgan Chase told The New York Times that it had not withdrawn any documents in a pending case. However, Chase has in fact withdrawn robo-signed documents in a case Tirelli is currently defending. Chase now faces possible sanctions in the case.

Cutting Corners

Why are the big, sophisticated banks submitting such problematic documents to the courts? The key reason is that sometimes when a bank wants to foreclose, it has to prove it actually has the right to foreclose -- that it owns the note and accompanying mortgage. Unfortunately for the banks, the securitization of mortgages and the changes in property-ownership documentation that accompanied such deals can make it hard for the banks to establish clean chains of title and produce original documents. That's especially difficult in an environment where a massive number of foreclosures must be started and completed in a timely manner.

Bankruptcy attorney O. Max Gardner explains that the time pressures to get these foreclosures done is overwhelming. One major foreclosure company, Lender Processing Services, actually rates attorneys on how quickly they complete each part of the foreclosure process for its mortgage-servicer clients, giving lawyers green, yellow or red labels to reflect their "Attorney Performance Rate." If an attorney fails to keep pace and lands in the red long enough, that attorney won't get any more business from LPS, or rather, from the banks LPS works for. Gardner calls it "stopwatch justice."

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So rather than take the time to generate the correct documentation, it seems the banks cut corners. Yet these are not small nicks off the end of the corners, despite protests from the banks that the documents are essentially true, just signed badly.

Documents like those cited in this article -- which are common -- falsify the chain of title for the underlying properties. Clean title is so crucial for real estate deals that they won't close if a seller can't give good title. In fact, one major title insurer, Old Republic National Title Insurance, will no longer insure titles for GMAC foreclosures because of the document problem. The stock market is weighing in, too, as shares of title insurers have taken a hit.

The chain-of-title problems has other practical consequences. Banks sometimes don't know which properties they can foreclose on. For example, banks have foreclosed on homes bought with cash. Two banks have tried to foreclose on the same property. And so on. The "mistakes" have been many.

Beyond the title problem is the fundamental issue of the integrity of the court system. When attorneys file false documents, it's called a fraud on the court for a reason: Courts can't function when lawyers do that.

The Bright Light of Bankruptcies

According to attorneys who assist clients facing foreclosure, bad documents have been turning up for years. So why is the practice only coming to light now? Because most people facing foreclosure don't have attorneys to check the documents. Most don't even contest the foreclosure.

Bankruptcy court is where most of the fraud comes out because in bankruptcy, to prove the bank is owed money and that its claim is "secured" -- meaning it should get paid first -- a bank has to prove it has the right to foreclose. It has to produce the necessary documents. Indeed, the reason that the banks are halting foreclosures in only 23 states is that in those states, judges are involved in the foreclosure process, meaning somebody might actually start looking at the documents.

Not all debtors in bankruptcy have attorneys, and not all those attorneys know what to look for. But enough attorneys have caught on to the bank's practices that robo-signer fraud is finally getting exposure on the same scale as it's being committed.

Caveats All Around

Title companies take note: It's increasingly obvious that GMAC's foreclosure problems are the tip of the iceberg. The title you insured on the resale of any foreclosed property -- particularly on mortgages that were included in securitizations -- might be clouded. Better double-check those documents.

Purchasers of foreclosed properties: I hope you bought title insurance. And you might want to get your lawyer to look at the foreclosure file.

Homeowners facing foreclosure: Make sure you or your attorney scrutinizes bank documents carefully because if anything is amiss, you may be able to get a meaningful modification of your mortgage instead of losing your home.

Banks submitting these documents: You could face big sanctions if courts notice you make the same kind of bad filings over and over.

Attorneys submitting these documents: If state bar associations start paying attention, you could risk your professional license on the robo-signed dotted line.

Friday, October 1, 2010

APNewsBreak: BofA delays foreclosures in 23 states

By ALAN ZIBEL
The Associated Press
Friday, October 1, 2010; 5:11 PM



WASHINGTON -- Bank of America says it is delaying foreclosures in 23 states as it examines whether it rushed the foreclosure process for thousands of homeowners without reading the documents.

Bank of America is not yet able to estimate how many homeowners cases will be affected, a spokesman for the nation's largest bank says.

A bank official acknowledged in a legal proceeding in February that she signed up to 8,000 foreclosure documents a month and typically didn't read them. The Associated Press obtained the document Friday.

The executive's admission adds the nation's largest bank to a growing list of mortgage companies whose employees signed documents in foreclosure cases without verifying the information in them.

Friday, September 24, 2010

How 2 Pro Bono Lawyers Uncovered ‘Robo-Signer,’ Halting Foreclosures in 23 States

By Debra Cassens Weiss
 
A Maine pro bono lawyer’s suspicions helped uncover a “robo-signer” mortgage employee and halt mortgage foreclosures in 23 states.
 
Pro bono lawyer Thomas Cox, who is retired from law practice, was representing a homeowner in a foreclosure case when he came across several documents signed by one GMAC employee: Jeffrey Stephan.
Cox, a lawyer in South Portland, Maine, turned for help to Geoffrey Lewis, a lawyer in Fryeburg, the Press Herald reports. In June, Cox deposed Stephan and learned that the employee of GMAC, now known as Ally Financial, was signing off on documents without verifying their accuracy.
 
It turned out that Stephan was signing 10,000 foreclosure documents a month, giving him only 1.5 minutes to review each document. Cox had uncovered information similar to that revealed in a December deposition. Both depositions were cited in a Washington Post story that says the revelations led Ally to halt foreclosures in 23 states and could pave the way to foreclosure challenges across the country.
 
"What blew me away," Cox told the Portland Press Herald, "was that Stephan admitted he didn't have custody of the file. It was scanned into a computer and he didn't even look at it. He didn't know if it was a true and accurate copy. He didn't read the affidavits. He just checked the numbers."
 
Cox and Lewis are volunteers with the pro bono group Maine Attorneys Saving Homes. They are still trying to get a summary judgment overturned in their client’s case.
 
Before retiring, Cox helped collect money from businesses that had borrowed money from a failed Maine bank, according to The Home Equity Theft Reporter blog, citing a story from the Morning Sentinel.

Foreclosure System Is ‘Riddled with Faked Documents’

By Debra Cassens Weiss
 
Revelations that an Ally Financial "robo-signer" employee routinely failed to review the lender's foreclosures for accuracy may be just the tip of the iceberg.
 
The admissions by the employee, charged with reviewing 10,000 cases a month, could have an impact beyond the 23 states where Ally has halted foreclosures, the Washington Post reported yesterday. Today the Washington Post reports that Ally isn’t the only lender whose employees failed to review foreclosure information before taking legal action.
 
According to the newspaper, “The nation's overburdened foreclosure system is riddled with faked documents, forged signatures and lenders who take shortcuts reviewing borrower's files, according to court documents and interviews with attorneys, housing advocates and company officials.”
 
Other lenders whose work is at issue include:
 
• JPMorgan Chase. One of its employees said in a May deposition that she signed off on thousands of foreclosures a month without verifying the accuracy.
 
• An employee of a document lending company owned by Lender Processing Services claimed to be an executive with several large banks, including Bank of America and Wells Fargo, when signing foreclosure affidavits. In one case she listed “bogus assignee” as the owner of a mortgage, and in another she signed as an officer of a fake company called “Bad Bene.” (The company says the names were just “placeholder phrasing.”)
 
Ally, formerly known as GMAC Mortgage Co., was used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to service its loans.

Thursday, September 16, 2010

Justice Peter Mayer of Suffolk County stalls GMAC's foreclosure action for failure to comply with RPAPL 1304

By:   Nicholas M. Moccia, Esq.

In GMAC Mtge. LLC v. Munoz, 2010 NY Slip Op 51598(U)(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 2010), Justice Peter H. Mayer of the Supreme Court in Suffolk County, denied a foreclosing bank's application for an order of reference in the furtherance of its foreclosure action due to its failure to comply with RPAPL 1304.  Justice Mayer writes:

The plaintiff's application is denied for failure to submit evidentiary proof, including an affidavit or affirmation from one with personal knowledge, of compliance with the type-size and content requirements of RPAPL §1304 regarding the pre-commencement notice required in foreclosure actions, as well as an affidavit of proper service of such notice by registered or certified mail and by first class mail to the last known address of the borrower as required by RPAPL §1304(2) or, in the alternative, an affidavit from one with personal knowledge sufficient to show why the requirements of RPAPL §1304 do not apply.
Justice Mayer noted that the foreclosing bank's complaint (with an out-of-county verification by an attorney) alleged that a notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304 was sent.  Remarkably, however, Mayer rejected the complaint's allegations with regard to RPAPL 1304 as "vague, boilerplate language, particularly in a complaint verified by an attorney without even personal knowledge."  Instead, Justice Mayer held that an "affidavit or affirmation from one with personal knowledge of compliance with the specific requirements of RPAPL 1304, or in the alternative, an affidavit sufficient to show why the requirements of RPAPL 1304 do not apply," was required.  Accordingly, a complaint with an out-of-county verification by an attorney does not constitute "evidentiary proof" of compliance with RPAPL 1304.

In the instant matter, the foreclosing bank identified the underlying loan as a non-traditional home loan.  For foreclosure actions commenced on or after September 1, 2008, RPAPL 1304 requires that with regard to a "high-cost home loan," a "subprime home loan" or a "non-traditional home loan," at least ninety (90) days before the lender or mortgage loan servicer commences legal action against the borrowe, the lender or servicer must give the borrower a specific, statutorily prescribed notice.  In essence, the notice warns the borrower that he or she may lose his or her home because of the loan default, and provides information regarding assistance for homeowners who are facing financial difficulty. The specific language and type-size requirements of the notice are set forth in RPAPL §1304(1). 

Pursuant to RPAPL 1304(2), the requisite 90-day notice must be "sent by the lender or mortgage loan servicer to the borrower, by registered or certified mail and also by first-class mail to the last known address of the borrower, and if different, to the residence which is the subject of the mortgage. Notice is considered given as of the date it is mailed." The notice must also contain a list of at least five housing counseling agencies approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, or those designated by the Division of Housing and Community Renewal, that serve the region where the borrower resides, as well as the counseling agencies' last known addresses and telephone numbers. Pursuant to RPAPL 1304(3), the 90-day period specified in RPAPL 1304(1) does not apply "if the borrower has filed an application for the adjustment of debts of the borrower or an order for relief from the payment of debts, or if the borrower no longer occupies the residence as the borrower's principal dwelling." 

It should be noted that 90 day notice prescribed by RPAPL 1304 now applies to all  home  loans for foreclosure actions commenced on or after December 15, 2009, not just high cost, subprime and non-traditional home loans.  For a peculiarly biased, but otherwise helpful exposition of the recent changes made by the New York State Assembly with regard to RPAPL 1304, see Bruce Bergman's blog post on this topic. 


Thursday, September 9, 2010

Bergman on Bankruptcy's relationship to foreclosures

By:        Nicholas Moccia, Esq.
             Law Offices of Robert E. Brown, P.C.

Bruce Bergman is a partner with Berkman, Henoch, Peterson & Peddy, P.C., who is a noted authority on New York foreclosure law.

In the N.Y. Real Property Law Journal (Summer 2010 Vol. 38 No. 3), Mr. Bergman provides some insight on the intersection of N.Y. foreclosure law and the Bankruptcy Code, and cites the following highlights:

  • The Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of certain prescribed actions against a debtor's property (11 U.S.C. s. 362[a]).  This includes foreclosure actions.
  • Imposition of the automatic stay is one of the fundamental protections afforded a debtor by the Bankruptcy Code.
  • The stay is effective immediately upon the filing of a petition without need for further action.
  • The stay is not limited to the litigants, but rather extends to a non-bankruptcy court too so that the stay serves to suspend any non-bankruptcy court authority to continue any judicial proceedings which are then pending against that debtor--including foreclosure actions.
  • Proceedings which the Bankruptcy Code stays upon a petition filing are void if they take place after the stay begins.
  • The power to address legal actions violative of the stay are given to the bankruptcy court itself--not the state court.
Bergman cites a particularly informative decision, namely Carr v. McGriff, 8 A.D.3d 420, 781 N.Y.S.2d 34 (2d Dep't 2004), whereby the Second Department held that the NY Supreme Courts (i.e. the state trial courts) had no power to ratify or annual a state foreclosure action commenced after the imposition of a bankruptcy stay.

Friday, September 3, 2010

American Home Mortgage Charged with Violating Debt Collection Laws

By:  Carrie Bay
Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott says American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc. is using illegal debt collection practices and misleading struggling homeowners, resulting in foreclosure for some borrowers.

Abbott brought formal charges against the company on Monday. According to a statement from the attorney general’s office, state investigators allege that American Home’s collections agents used “aggressive and unlawful tactics” to collect payments from Texas homeowners who had difficulty meeting their mortgage obligations, and then failed to credit homeowners who properly submitted their payments on time.
Investigators allege that in other cases, the servicer’s agents falsely claimed that homeowners did not make payments so they could justify late fees or escrow accounts, and then failed to properly credit homeowners even after withdrawing funds directly from borrowers’ checking accounts. 

“Because of the defendant’s unlawful conduct, homeowners defaulted on their loans, leading to foreclosure proceedings,” according to the attorney general’s office.

Abbott also says that although American Home Mortgage claims to have a “Home Retention Team” to assist distressed homeowners, many customers found that the company could not qualify borrowers for assistance to halt the foreclosure process. 

The attorney general says some homeowners who actually obtained loan modifications found that their monthly payments increased rather than decreased, which worsened their problem with foreclosure. Industry studies show, however, that this is not an uncommon outcome among more servicers than just American Home Mortgage.

The attorney general is charging American Home Mortgage with multiple violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The state is seeking civil penalties of up to $20,000 per violation.

American Home Mortgage did not respond to requests for comment regarding Abbott’s allegations and the pending lawsuit.

American Home Mortgage Servicing is headquartered in Coppell, Texas, and also has offices in Irvine, California, and Jacksonville, Florida. 

The company is considered to be the nation’s largest independent subprime mortgage servicer, and is owned and funded by the private equity firm WL Ross & Co., named for its founder and chairman, investment sage Wilbur Ross.

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

New Home Sales: US New Home Sales Sink to Lowest Pace on Record - CNBC

By: Reuters










    New U.S. single-family home sales unexpectedly fell in July to set their slowest pace on record while prices were the lowest in more than 6-1/2 years, government data showed on Wednesday.

    The Commerce Department said sales dropped 12.4 percent to a 276,000 unit annual rate, the lowest since the series started in 1963, from a downwardly revised 315,000 units in June. 


    New Home Sales: US New Home Sales Sink to Lowest Pace on Record - CNBC

    Money Politics Blog — Larry Kudlow: In Praise (!) of Barney Frank — CNBC, CNBC.com Market and Economy News - CNBC

    Can you teach an old dog new tricks? In politics, the answer is usually no. Most elected officials cling to their ideological biases, despite the real-world facts that disprove their theories time and again. Most have no common sense, and most never acknowledge that they were wrong.

    But one huge exception to this rule is Democrat Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee.




    Money Politics Blog — Larry Kudlow: In Praise (!) of Barney Frank — CNBC, CNBC.com Market and Economy News - CNBC

    Monday, August 23, 2010

    Class action RICO suit against Steven J. Baum, P.C., commenced.

     Hundreds of Millions in Damages Demanded for New York Homeowners

    New York, NY (PRWEB) August 20, 2010

    On August 17, 2010, attorney Susan Chana Lask filed a Federal Class Action Complaint on behalf of tens of thousands of New York State homeowners who lost their homes to an alleged foreclosure fraud orchestrated for years by a New York “foreclosure mill” attorney and major mortgage companies. The case is filed in the US District Court, Eastern District of New York, entitled “Connie Campbell against Steven Baum, MERSCORP, Inc, et al.”, Case #10CV3800. It alleges RICO civil racketeering, RESPA, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violations and that homeowners paid inflated foreclosure and other fees fictionalized by Mr. Baum who profited from the scheme since 2005.

    [continue reading]

    Tuesday, August 17, 2010

    Justice Giacobbe of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Richmond, allows foreclosure to proceed despite bankruptcy filing

    By:  Nicholas M. Moccia, Esq.
           Law Offices of Robert E. Brown, P.C.

    Justice Giacobbe of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Richmond, rendered an informative decision which should serve as a warning to homeowner's who seek to game the system by making multiple filings for bankruptcy.

    In brief, three different family members of the same household made multiple filings for bankruptcy, each in succession during a single sixteen month period, in order to delay a foreclosure action.  Justice Giacobbe notes that  it is well settled that upon the filing of a debtor's bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay is triggered preventing the commencement or continuance of any lawsuit to recover claims against the debtor.  11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1).  The stay is mandatory in nature and is intended to give the debtor "breathing room" by putting a stop on all collection efforts.  Soars v. Brockton Credit Union, 107 F3d 969 (1st Cir. 1979).  However, where family members or other individuals with a "unity of interest" are found to act in collusion to avoid their just debts by abusing the relief afforded by bankruptcy, the courts may vacate the bankruptcy stay and allow inter alia foreclosure actions to proceed.  In the instant matter, Justice Giacobbe found that the defendants and a third non-party family member, each acted in collusion to improperly delay a foreclosure action with multiple bankruptcy filings.  Justice Giacobbe vacated all temporary restraints and allowed the foreclosure to proceed notwithstanding the bankruptcy stay.  Justice Giacobbe cites the following federal authority in support of his holding:  In re Wong, 30 BR 87, 89 (U.S. Bank. Ct. C.D. Cal. 1983); In re Thirtieth Place, Inc., 30 BR 503 (U.S. Bank. A.P. 9th Cir 1983); see also, In re Kinney, 51 BR 840 (U.S. Bank. Ct. C.D. Cal 1985).


    For full text of decision, follow link:

    Washington Mut. Bank v Phillips, 2010 NY Slip Op 32139(U) (Sup. Ct.  Richmond County, July 28, 2010)

    For a bio on Justice Giacobbe, follow link:

    http://www.richmondcountybar.org/newsletter/pdf/winter2001.pdf

    Friday, August 13, 2010

    Bankruptcy and Mortgage Stripdowns: Learning from Experience


    Using the farm crisis of the early 1980s as a model, two economists have refuted several of the arguments against legislation that would permit bankruptcy judges to cramdown or stripdown of mortgage loans.  Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV and James B Thomson, economists with the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, published their paper, Stripdowns and Bankruptcy: Lessons from Agricultural Bankruptcy Reform in the bank's Economic Commentary on its website.

    Allowing stripdowns of mortgages during Chapter 13 bankruptcy reorganization has been suggested as one way to deal with the housing crisis.  If such legislation were passed, bankruptcy judges would be allowed to reduce the outstanding balance on a mortgage loan to the actual value of the underlying collateral, turning the remaining balance of the mortgage into an unsecured claim which would receive the same proportionate payout as other unsecured debts included in the bankruptcy petition. Some proponents of this provision maintain it could be a partial solution to the foreclosure crisis, reducing the number of homes going into foreclosure by improving the chances of a successful loan modification.  Others favor the law on the basis of equity, saying that mortgages on rental properties and vacation homes as well as virtually every other type of secured loan can be stripped down during Chapter 13 proceedings.

    Those opposing stripdown legislation fear an increase in mortgage interest rates, apparently in response to any increase in loan modifications rather than to the stripdown itself.  The unintended consequences of this, they argue, might be to make homeownership less affordable and accessible to low and moderate income families.  Opponents also cite the possibility of an avalanche of Chapter 13 filings should stripdowns become law in the midst of the current financial crisis. Lenders have been the most vocal of opponents, arguing that stripdowns would shift losses from borrowers to lenders, give bankruptcy judges too much discretion, and that such shifting is unfair in that it changes the rules of contracts after the fact. 

    The economists maintain that such arguments are best viewed against the empirical evidence from the actual experience with stripdowns done under legislation establishing the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. This legislation established a separate chapter in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 12 intended solely for farmers.  The legislation was passed in response to an agricultural and bank crisis in the 1980s and originally had a sunset provision, but worked well enough that it was twice extended and then made permanent in 2005. 

    The agricultural lending crisis had some strong parallels with the more recent home lending meltdown, as well as, Patrick and Thomson point out, some distinct differences and many of the claims and concerns expressed in the current debate were central in the debate over Chapter 12. 

    The agricultural lending crisis started in the 1970s when US farm exports rose over 500 percent, from $8.24 to $43.78 billion in a nine year period starting in 1972. This led to a dramatic rise in commodity prices and farm incomes over that time period. Net farm income peaked at over $27 billion in 1979, a rise of 41 percent over the decade. 

    It was a typical boom-bust scenario: When prices for their goods were rising, farms expanded and farm real estate prices increased significantly; in Iowa, for example, the price of farm land more than quadrupled from 1970 to 1982. But, while demand for their products had increased sharply in the early 1970s, farmers watched it fall almost as fast in the late 1970s and early 80s. With the drop in demand and price for products the demand and price for land fell too.  That Iowa land lost nearly two-thirds of its value in five years, and the same thing happened nationally.  The average price of farmland increased more than 350 percent by 1982 then fell by more than a third in the next five years. 

    As the price was going up, so did agricultural debt loads as many farmers borrowed to acquire additional acreage. Cash-short and expecting increased income, many farmers used variable-rate notes to purchase real estate. Caught up in the boom, lenders eased underwriting standards, relying on the continued appreciation of the land for security rather than the ability of the farmers to service their debt.  But as prices and cash flows decreased and the variable-rate notes used to purchase farm real estate reset, many farmers saw their interest rates increase, found that they could not make payments and were underwater on their mortgages.

    Farmland values peaked in 1981 in the Midwest, where the land-price appreciation had been the greatest, and declined by as much as 49 percent over the next few years before bottoming out in 1987. Farm-sector debt quadrupled from the early 1970s through the mid-1980s. Debt declined by one-third from 1984 through 1987, but much of this reduction reflected the liquidation of farms.

    Many farmers, especially in the South and Midwest, were underwater with their agricultural loans and were in danger of losing their primary residences with little relief possible under the existing bankruptcy laws.  Chapter 13 did not allow for modification of debt secured by a primary residence, and Chapter 11, intended for corporations, was too complex for most small and medium sized farmers and also contained provisions that made a stripdown problematic.

    Some states enacted moratoriums on foreclosures but they provided only temporary relief given the underlying economic factors (does any of this sound familiar yet) and left many farmers unable to service their debt and with almost no possibility of renegotiating their secured loans. 

    Fitzpatrick and Thomson point out that, unlike in the current foreclosure crisis, the troubled debt then was highly concentrated a few Farm Credit Banks, Farmer Mac and commercial banks in the affected regions.  Nonetheless, these agriculturally related banks began to fail in 1984 and accounted for a third of all bank failures between 1983 and 1987.  This led to the Chapter 12 legislation and its related stripdowns provisions. Despite the same arguments we hear today, Congress permitted stripdowns for farmers because voluntary modification efforts, even when subsidized by the government, did not lead agricultural lenders to negotiate loan modifications. 

    The actual negative impact of the legislation was minor. Even though the new section of the Bankruptcy Code was created specifically for farmers, it did not change the cost and availability of farm credit dramatically. In fact, a United States General Accounting Office (1989) survey of a small group of bankers found that none of them raised interest rates to farmers more than 50 basis points. The economists say that while this rate change may have been a response to the Chapter 12, it is also consistent with increasing premiums due to the economic environment and  suggest that the changes in the cost and availability of farm credit after the bankruptcy reform differed little from what would be expected in that economic environment, absent reform.
    The Commentary says, "What was most interesting about Chapter 12 is that it worked without working.  According to studies by Robert Collender (1993) and Jerome Stam and Bruce Dixon (2004), instead of flooding bankruptcy courts, Chapter 12 drove the parties to make private loan modifications. In fact, although the U.S. General Accounting Office reports that more than 30,000 bankruptcy filings were expected the year Chapter 12 went into effect, only 8,500 were filed in the first two years. Since then, Chapter 12 bankruptcy filings have continued to fall."

    Despite the controversy that accompanied Chapter 12 and is stirring around the idea of a stripdown authority today, economists say that the "effects of the stripdown provision, in place for more than two decades, on the availability and terms of agricultural credit suggest that there has been little if any economically significant impact on the cost and availability of that credit."  They do, however, point out some significant differences between the agricultural foreclosure crisis of the 1980s and the current home foreclosure crisis. 

    "First, the structure of the underlying loan markets is different. Unlike mortgages today, few if any of the farm loans in the 1980s were sold or securitized. Moreover, there was more direct government involvement in agricultural loan markets in the 1980s than there was in the mortgage markets leading up to the current housing crisis. Finally, the scale of the current foreclosure crisis is several times larger than the 1980s agricultural crisis, which was limited geographically to the Midwest and Great Plains states. Yet, despite these differences, the response to the farm foreclosure crisis and the impact of bankruptcy reform on agricultural credit markets is still informative for the current debate."

    Wednesday, August 11, 2010

    Justice Maltese of Richmond County finds that homeowner’s reliance on a non-attorney’s “expertise” in foreclosure litigation constitutes a reasonable excuse to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale on default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)


    By Nicholas M. Moccia

    In a decision rendered on August 3, 2010, Justice Joseph J. Maltese of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Richmond County, vacated a judgment of foreclosure and sale pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) and held that a homeowner’s misplaced reliance on a non-attorney’s “expertise” in foreclosure litigation constitutes a “reasonable excuse” for the purposes of vacating a homeowner's default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a).

    Justice Maltese writes:

    The residential real estate foreclosure crisis has ensnared communities, both large and small from coast to coast.  And as this crisis continues to unfold before the eyes of the courts and the public, the unsavory actions taken by mortgage brokers, lenders and some predatory refinance facilitators is outrageous.  While the public only begins to learn of the causes of the current rampant foreclosure filings, the courts have already begun to see a cadre of unscrupulous individuals promising foreclosure cure-alls that prey upon those already approaching an economic rock bottom.

    In this case we have a defendant, [RC], who initially engaged an attorney as she sought to refinance her way out of foreclosure by consulting with HCI Mortgage Bank.  According to the defendant, she became the victim of a “scam” when she attempted to refinance her loan to prevent the plaintiff from foreclosing.  This left to her filing a bankruptcy petition, which was the result of poor advice from “refinance specialists who were attempting to slow down the process in order to convince the defendant to take out yet another loan with a lender they represent.”

    Justice Maltese continues:

    Here, while the defendant realized that she was not savvy enough to navigate the field of foreclosure litigation on her own, she put her trust in a licensed realtor, rather than in a new attorney.  The record indicates that Herricson Torres, a licensed realtor, purportedly assisted [RC] in preparing this order to show cause to help guide her through the litigation process demonstrates the rampant economic opportunism of a growing industry that preys on those least able to support it.  Mr. Torres’s actions are the very definition of the unauthorized practice of law.  (Emphasis supplied).

    This court finds that [RC’s] subsequent reliance on Torres’s “expertise” to stop the foreclosure sale as evidence of a larger problem in the area of foreclosure litigation…Based on the totality of the circumstances the court finds that [RC’s] reliance on Herricson Torres’s “expertise”, rather than on a licensed attorney constitutes a reasonable excuse for her default.

    A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default, and the existence of a meritorious defense.  Orwell Bldg. Corp. v. Bessaha, 5 A.D.3d 573 (2d Dep’t 2004).  A motion to vacate a default is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent an abuse of discretion, the court’s decision will not be disturbed.  Gleissner v. Singh, 264 A.D.2d 811 (2d Dep’t 1999).  Public policy favors the resolution of cases on their merits, and courts have broad discretion to grant relief from pleading defaults where the defaulting party has a meritorious claim or defense, the default was not willful, and the opposing party was not prejudiced.   Harris v. City of New York, 30 A.D.3d 461 (2d Dep’t 2006).  The determination of whether there is a reasonable excuse for a default is a discretionary, sui generis determination to be made by the court based on all relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, whether there has been prejudice to the opposing party, whether these has been willfulness, and the strong public policy of resolving cases on the merits.  Harcztark v. Drive Variety, Inc., 21 A.D.3d 876 (2d dep’t 2005).

    Here, Justice Maltese found that a defendant homeowner’s misplaced reliance on the expertise of a non-attorney in foreclosure litigation constitutes a “reasonable excuse” within the meaning of CPLR 5015(a).

    The defendant homeowner eventually received legal assistance from Margaret Becker, Esq., from Staten Island Legal Services, and later from Robert E. Brown, Esq. of the Law Offices of Robert E. Brown, P.C., who expanded on the defendant homeowner’s initial order to show cause resulting in the favorable decision rendered by Justice Maltese discussed herein. 

    For more posts on Justice Maltese see below: