Monday, December 23, 2013

MFY Files Suit against Mortgage Scammer

ECONOMIC JUSTICE

MFY Files Suit against Mortgage Scammer

On November 18, 2013, MFY filed a lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Elva Brardo, a 60-year-old Queens County homeowner who lost thousands of dollars as part of a foreclosure rescue scam perpetrated by American Hope Group, Inc., The Donado Law Firm A Professional Corporation, and multiple individual defendants.  After charging Ms. Brardo an illegal, upfront fee, defendants falsely promised that an alleged “Securitization Mortgage Audit” would identify errors in her mortgage loan documents and this so-called erroneous information would be used to compel her lender to provide her with a more affordable monthly mortgage payment.  In addition to a loan modification, Ms. Brardo was promised legal representation to prevent foreclosure. 

 Even though Ms. Brardo signed a purported retainer agreement with The Donado Law Firm at American Hope’s office and authorized American Hope Group to automatically debit nearly $700 per month from her checking account in additional fees, defendants never obtained a more affordable mortgage payment for Ms. Brardo and never provided her with the promised legal representation.  In fact, Ms. Brardo never met nor spoke to any attorney.  The complaint asserts claims for violation of New York’s “distressed property consultant” law, Real Property Law § 265-b, which among other things makes it illegal to charge up-front fees for loan modification services; violation of New York’s Deceptive Practices Act, General Business Law § 349; and breach of contract. The lawsuit seeks to recover the illegal upfront fees paid to the defendants and also seeks to enjoin defendants from engaging in the deceptive acts and practices alleged.


Brardo v. American Hope Group, Inc., et al, Index No. 21154/2013, Supreme Court, Queens County

READ THE COMPLAINT

Monday, December 16, 2013

Governor Cuomo Announces Proposal to Expand Mortgage Relief for Underwater Homeowners Through Principal Reduction

Governor Cuomo proposed to expand the mortgage relief options available to struggling ‘underwater’ homeowners, who owe more than the current market value of their homes. Using “Shared Appreciation” mortgage modifications banks and mortgage servicers reduce the amount of principal outstanding on a borrower’s mortgage in exchange for a share of the future increase in the value of the home. 

Friday, November 8, 2013

Columbia Capital v. Cuervo: The Issue of Standing...

In the NY case of Columbia Capital v. Cuervo, the Court just recently found that a homeowner waived a standing defense by not raising the issue of standing in the answer.  

"Homeowners need to make sure that they raise standing even if they put in a pro se answer!"


-Robert E. Brown, Esq.
The Law Offices of Robert E. Brown, PC

Friday, October 25, 2013

Jury Finds Bank of America Unit and an Executive Liable for Mortgage Fraud

In another major victory for the Justice Department over mortgage securities sold during the financial crisis, a jury found Bank of America’s (BAC) Countrywide unitliable for defrauding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with loans it should have known were substandard.
The penalty is yet to be determined. The government has requested a maximum of almost $850 million, Bloomberg News reported. Rebecca Mairone, a former executive at Countrywide, was also found liable, as the jury heard details of a program she oversaw called the High Speed Swim Lane—aka “the hustle”—that earned the lender at least $165 million.
The Justice Department is also on the verge of reaching a record $13 billion settlement with JPMorgan Chase (JPM) over faulty mortgage securities that the bank and two institutions it bought during the crisis, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, sold. Bank of America bought Countrywide in July 2008.
During the four-week trial, prosecutors argued that HSSL processed nearly 30,000 loans with more regard for speed than quality. “Quality was no more than a distraction,” Assistant U.S. Attorney Jaimie Nawaday said in her closing argument, according to Bloomberg’s Patricia Hurtado.
Shares of Bank of America fell as the news was announced this afternoon and were trading at $14.18 after hours, down from the previous day’s close of $14.51. The stock has returned 22.7 percent this year, trailing a 28.1 percent return for the KBW Bank Index.
“The jury’s decision concerned a single Countrywide program that lasted several months and ended before Bank of America’s acquisition of the company,” a bank spokesman said in an e-mail to Bloomberg. “We will evaluate our options for appeal.”

Thursday, October 3, 2013

U.S. Bank National Assoc.v. Thomas, 7054/09

U.S. Bank N.A. v Thomas | NYSC – ASC/Wells has failed to comply with federal HAMP guidelines, and failed to complete its modification review... Referee's Report And Recommendation Supported By Record, Which Indicated Foreclosing Parties Failed To Negotiate In Good Faith...

The full story can be found here: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com


Wednesday, October 2, 2013

New York to Sue Wells Fargo Over Mortgage Settlement

Fielding complaints from borrowers struggling to save their homes, New York’s top prosecutor is preparing a lawsuit against Wells Fargo, accusing the bank, the nation’s largest home lender, of flouting the terms of a multi-billion-dollar settlement aimed at stanching foreclosure abuses.

The lawsuit, which is expected to be filed as early as Wednesday, accuses Wells Fargo of violating the guidelines of a broad agreement reached last year between five of the nation’s largest banks and 49 state attorneys general.
Under that deal, the banks must comply with 304 servicing standards. The guidelines map out how banks should field and process requests from distressed homeowners.
Vickee J. Adams, a spokeswoman for Wells Fargo, said the bank had not been served with a copy of the lawsuit. But, she added, “if true, it is very disappointing that the New York attorney general continues to pursue his course, given our commitment to the terms of the National Mortgage Settlement and ongoing engagement.
“Wells Fargo has been a leader in preventing foreclosures, helping families maintain homeownership with more than 880,000 modifications nationwide and 26,000 in New York over the last four years,” she said.
The New York attorney general, Eric T. Schneiderman, sent a previous warning shot to Bank of America and Wells Fargo, announcing in May that he had found that both banks violated the terms of the mortgage settlement. That announcement prompted negotiations between the New York prosecutor’s office and the two banks.
The outcomes for the lenders are starkly different. While Wells Fargo is bracing for a lawsuit, Bank of America is poised to announce a series of additional protections that it has adopted after discussions with Mr. Schneiderman’s office. Those additional protections — including an agreement to designate a “high-level” employee dedicated to fielding and responding to questions from housing counselors — appear to have won the bank a reprieve from a lawsuit.
“We are pleased to resolve these matters without litigation,” said a spokesman for Bank of America, Dan B. Frahm. “Along with the settlement monitoring committee, we continue to improve the experience for eligible customers and groups that represent them.”
Wells Fargo is also working with the monitor on additional consumer protections.
More state attorneys general may follow Mr. Schneiderman’s lead. The Massachusetts attorney general, Martha Coakley, has also sent a letter to Joseph A. Smith, the settlement monitor, outlining “recurring issues” with servicers, according to a copy of the letter reviewed by The New York Times.
For Wells Fargo, though, the discussions with the New York attorney general’s office resulted in a standoff. Mr. Schneiderman’s office, people briefed on the matter said, had pushed Wells Fargo to acknowledge a systematic pattern of mortgage servicing errors and to commit to a new agreement codifying changes to the way the bank services mortgages. Wells Fargo balked, the people said, and the talks broke down last week.
Amid the languishing talks, the bank sent a letter to Mr. Schneiderman’s office, reiterating its commitment to “helping borrowers maintain homeownership and achieve long-term financial success,” according to a copy of the letter reviewed by The Times.
Mr. Schneiderman had found 210 separate violations involving the bank and 96 borrowers. Four of those borrowers, the letter said, were not Wells Fargo customers. In its letter, the bank said it “disagrees with allegations” related to the remaining borrowers. Of the remainder, the bank has approved loan modifications for 39 customers and made a final decision on the loan modification applications for 28 others. Beyond helping the homeowners identified by the attorney general’s office, Wells Fargo voluntarily improved its processes, the bank argued in its letter.
Those concessions apparently did not appease Mr. Schneiderman’s office. Part of the problem, the people briefed on the matter said, was that Wells Fargo refused to improve their processes in a formal agreement.
Some within the attorney general’s office also felt the bank’s proposed fixes constituted a Whac-a-Mole approach in which it addressed only the cases originally highlighted, the people briefed on the matter said. The New York attorney general’s office still receives more complaints about Wells Fargo’s servicing than for any other lender, they added.
The settlement guidelines include requirements that banks provide homeowners with a single point of contact and notify borrowers of missing documentation within five days.
They are intended to help homeowners who are looking to modify their mortgages — a process that can prove frustrating for homeowners asked to submit the same documents again and again.
Such delays can mean the difference between saving a home and losing it to foreclosure, according to housing counselors. When applications for relief languish with borrowers caught in a bureaucratic maze, homeowners amass additional costs.
Ms. Adams of Wells Fargo said that the bank “continuously implements additional customer-focused measures based on the constructive feedback we receive from our customers, the monitoring committee and individual states, including New York.” She added that the bank believed a “collaborative approach” was better for homeowners than “protracted litigation.”
The move against Wells Fargo is the first time that an attorney general has sued one of the five participating banks on charges related to the settlement. That settlement, reached in 2012, sprung from an investigation that began in 2010 amid a national outcry that banks were relying on mass-produced documents to evict homeowners wrongfully.

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Judge Jack M. Battaglia: "Defendant was Not in Default... " -- Wells Fargo Bank v Butler

"Judge Jack M. Battaglia of Kings County Supreme Court recently found that a  Defendant was Not in Default for 'Informal Appearances' in Foreclosure Settlement Part and judgment by default may not be entered against her."

-Robert E. Brown, Esq.

Wells Fargo Bank v Butler

[*1] Wells Fargo Bank v Butler 2013 NY Slip Op 23282 Decided on August 23, 2013 Supreme Court, Kings County Battaglia, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the printed Official Reports. 

Decided on August 23, 2013 
Supreme Court, Kings County 

Wells Fargo Bank, as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-1, Plaintiff, 

against

Pamala Butler, New York City Environmental Control Board, New York City Parking Violations Bureau, New York City Transit Adjudication Bureau, and "JOHN DOE No. 1" through "JOHN DOE # 10," the last ten names being fictitious and unknown to the plaintiff, the person or parties intended being the person or parties, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the mortgaged premises described in the complaint, Defendants. 



30914/07 



Plaintiff was represented by Linda P. Manfredi, Esq. of Frankel Lambert Weiss Weisman & Gordon, LLP. Defendant Pamela Butler sued herein as Pamala Butler was self-represented. 

Jack M. Battaglia, J.

In this mortgage foreclosure action commenced on August 17, 2007, Plaintiff seeks an order, among other things, granting judgment by default and an order of reference. The mortgaged property is located at 518 Georgia Avenue, Brooklyn; the mortgagor is defendant Pamala Butler. With a Decision and Order dated January 10, 2008, this Court denied Plaintiff's first ex parte application [*2]for the same relief, with leave to renew; and with a Decision and Order dated September 10, 2008, this Court denied Plaintiff's renewed application, again with leave to renew.
These denials were based in part on the Court's determining that Plaintiff had not submitted sufficient "proof of the facts constituting . . . the default" (see CPLR 3215[f]), because the affidavit of service on defendant/mortgagor Pamala Butler did not establish prima facie that she was properly served. Specifically, on the second denial the Court stated:
"In an order denying Plaintiff's prior application for a default judgment and an order of reference, this Court pointed out that the affidavit of service on Pamala Butler describes nail and mail' service at 518 Georgia Avenue, the mortgaged premises, but does not assert that 518 Georgia Avenue was Ms. Butler's actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode' or last known residence.' (See CPLR 308[4].)
In the instant renewed motion, Plaintiff attaches a new affidavit of service indicating that Pamala Butler was purportedly served by nail and mail' by affixing the summons and complaint on the door of Ms. Butler's usual place of abode.' Prior to resorting to nail and mail' service, Plaintiff's process server avers that he attempted personal service at Ms. Butler's usual place of abode on Friday, August 17, 2007 at 3:15 pm; Monday, August 20, 2007 at 10:10 am; and Thursday, August 23, 2007 at 9:30 pm.
CPLR 308(4) authorizes "nail and mail" service to be used only where personal service under CPLR 308(1) and (2) cannot be made with "due diligence".' (County of Nassau v Letosky, 34 AD3d 414, 415 [2d Dept 2006].) The due diligence requirement of CPLR 308(4) must be strictly observed, given the reduced likelihood that a summons served pursuant to that section will be received.' (Id. [quoting Gurevitch v Goodman, 269 AD2d 355, 355 (2d Dept 2000)].)
Service under circumstances similar to those here was found insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in O'Connel v Post (27 AD3d 630 [2d Dept 2006]) [T]wo of the attempts at service occurred on weekdays during hours when it reasonably could have been expected that the defendant was either working or in transit to and from work.' (See id., at 631.) And there is no indication that the process server made any effort to determine [Ms. Butler's] business address in order to attempt personal service thereat pursuant to CPLR 308(2) before resorting to "nail and mail" service.' (Id.) (See also County of Nassau v Yohannan, 34 AD3d 620 [2d Dept 2006].) Indeed, a mortgagee would be expected to have a business address for its mortgagor."
The instant motion was served in December 2008, with an initial return date of January 7, 2009. The motion was not heard, however, because the action was referred to the Foreclosure Settlement Conference Part for mandatory settlement conference proceedings pursuant to CPLR 3408, and the motion was "held in abeyance" pursuant to court rule (see Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court and the County Court, §202.12-a [c][7]; 22 NYCRR §202.12-a [c][7].)
Over the following four years, from January 2009 until March 2013, according to the case [*3]management database, the parties appeared 25 times in the Foreclosure Settlement Conference Part. With a Directive dated March 15, 2013, the action and the pending motion were referred to this Court, with an appearance scheduled for June 24 by administrative process over which the Court had no control. On that date, 50 motions were scheduled, together with seven foreclosure conferences, making it impossible for the Court to adequately address this action. The matter was adjourned to August 12.
At the August 12 conference, Pamala Butler having appeared, as she had on June 24, the Court suggested that, under the circumstances, it might serve the interests of both parties for Plaintiff to conditionally withdraw its motion pending receipt of an answer from Ms. Butler. The Court noted in particular Ms. Butler's many appearances in the Foreclosure Settlement Conference Part. Plaintiff's counsel subsequently advised the Court that Plaintiff preferred to have the motion determined as submitted.
Subsequent caselaw confirms that this Court correctly determined that, based upon Plaintiff's submission on its first renewal motion, proper service on defendant/mortgagor Butler had not been shown. (See Serrano v Staropoli, 94 AD3d 1083, 1085 [2d Dept 2012]; Prudence v Wright, 94 AD3d 1073, 1074 [2d Dept 2012]; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Iancu Pizza, Ltd., 78 AD3d 902, 903 [2d Dept 2010]; see also McSorely v Spear, 50 AD3d 652, 653-54 [2d Dept 2008].) "What constitutes due diligence is determined on a case-by-case basis, focusing not on the quantity of the attempts at personal delivery, but on their quality." (Id. at 653.)
On this second renewal, Plaintiff submits an Amended Affidavit Information Pertaining to Nail and Mail Service of Demetra D. Karamitsos, and a copy of a Uniform Residential Loan Application dated November 9, 2004 purportedly executed by defendant/mortgagor Pamala Butler. Since the original Affidavit of Service was made by Ben Cohen, and this Amended Affidavit is based on information purportedly received from "deponent's agent," which is clearly hearsay and not shown to be admissible as evidence under any exception to the hearsay rule, it adds nothing to Plaintiff's showing. In any event, the only reference to a search for a business address for Ms. Butler is to "a search of a database system" that "revealed no possible places of employment for the defendant Pamala Butler," which, even if admissible, would have virtually no probative value.
As to the loan application, "the defendant's [sic] listed her place of employment at the same address service was effectuated and she further noted that she was self-employed" (see Affirmation in Support ¶ 12.) But there is no evidence that the loan application was provided to the process server, and nothing in the Amended Affidavit to suggest that the information contained therein in any way affected service. Moreover, information provided in 2004 would not satisfy the "due diligence" requirement three years later without further investigation.
The Court concludes, therefore, that "the service of the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR 308(4) was defective as a matter of law" (see Prudence v Wright, 94 AD3d at 1074; see also Gray v Giannikios, 90 AD3d 836, 837 [2d Dept 2011]; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Iancu Pizza, Ltd., 78 AD3d at 903.) But, "because improper service of the summons and complaint is a defense [*4]that may be waived," sua sponte dismissal of the complaint would be inappropriate. (See Dupps v Betancourt, 99 AD3d 855, 856 [2d Dept 2012].)
The Court has noted Plaintiff's argument that "the defendant has appeared in this action as she filed a motion to dismiss with the court which has never been placed on the Court's calendar"; and, "[t]herefore, it is clear the defendant is aware of the . . . foreclosure action and is actively participating in the same." (Affidavit in Support ¶ 12.) No motion to dismiss appears in the court's case management database, and defendant Butler does not refer to one in her opposition. Plaintiff offers no other factual basis for defendant Butler's "appearance," does not expressly contend that she has waived any jurisdictional defense, and cites no legal authority for any such contention. The Court finds it both unnecessary and inappropriate to address the question. (See, generally, CPLR 320[b]; Henderson v Henderson, 247 NY 428, 432 [1928]; In re Estate of Katz, 81 AD2d 145, 147-49 [2d Dept 1981], aff'd 55 NY2d 904 [1982]; Taveras v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 5199 [2d Dept, July 10, 2013]; Dyker Heights Home for Blind Children v Stolitzky, 250 AD 229, 230 [2d Dept 1937].)
But Plaintiff's argument begs the question, if defendant Pamala Butler has appeared in the action, is she "in default" for purposes of entry of judgment by default? CPLR 320(a) provides, "The defendant appears by serving an answer or a notice of appearance or by making a motion which has the effect of extending the time to answer." For the most part, caselaw is clear that, where a defendant makes an "informal appearance" within the time specified by CPLR 320(a), the defendant is not "in default," and a motion to enter judgment by default should be denied. (See Jeffers v Stein, 99 AD3d 970, 971 [2d Dept 2012]; Stewart v Raymond Corp., 84 AD3d 932, 933 [2d Dept 2011]; Parrotta v Wolgin, 245 AD2d 872, 873 [3d Dept 1997]; Cohen v Ryan, 34 AD2d 789 [2d Dept 1970]; see also Meyer v A & B Am., 160 AD2d 688, 688 [2d Dept 1990]; but see U.S. Bank N.A. v Slavinski, 78 AD3d 1167, 1167 [2d Dept 2010] [dictum].)
There is also authority that at least suggests that, under some circumstances, an "informal appearance" after the expiration of the time to answer or move specified in CPLR 320(a) will preclude entry of judgment by default. (See City of Newburgh v 96 Broadway LLC, 72 AD3d 632, 633 [2d Dept 2010]; Carlin v Carlin, 52 AD3d 559, 560-61 [2d Dept 2008]; Ambers v C.T. Indus., 161 AD2d 256, 256-57 [1st Dept 1990]; Taylor v Taylor, 64 AD2d 592, 592 [1st Dept 1978]; see also Rubenstein v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 280 AD2d 312, 313 [1st Dept 2001] [dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c)]; Baron & Gleich v Epstein, 168 AD2d 589 [2d Dept 1990].) Participation in court conferences can constitute an "informal appearance" for this purpose. (See Carlin v Carlin, 52 AD3d at 560-61; Rubenstein v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 280 AD2d at 313; see also Matter of Sessa v Board of Assessors of Town of N. Elba, 46 AD3d 1163, 1166 [3d Dept 2007].)
The Second Department's opinion in Carlin v Carlin (52 AD3d 559) is most instructive here:
"[A]lthough the defendant failed to timely file an answer, she, among other things, opposed the plaintiff's numerous motions, interposed cross-motions, and appeared and participated at a [*5]preliminary conference. Accordingly, especially given the liberal approach adopted by the courts in matrimonial actions which favors dispositions on the merits . . . , the defendant made an informal appearance in the action and is therefore not in default." (Carlin v Carlin, 52 AD3d at 560-61; see also Baron & Gleich v Epstein, 168 AD2d at 589 ["courts have a special interest in contracts between attorneys and clients"].)
Here, according to the court's case management database, defendant Butler appeared 25 times in the Foreclosure Settlement Conference Part, appeared twice before this Court after the action was released from that Part, and has served opposition to Plaintiff's renewal motion. CPLR 3408 mandates settlement conference proceedings in residential mortgage foreclosure actions (see CPLR 3408[a]), at which "[b]oth the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible" (see CPLR 3408[f].) The clear and simple purpose of the settlement conference process is to keep people in their homes "if possible," and thereby avoid the economic and social costs of foreclosure to individuals, families, and communities. Public policy in favor of disposition on the merits is at its strongest in residential foreclosure actions.
The Court concludes, therefore, that defendant Pamala Butler is not in default, and judgment by default may not be entered against her.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks judgment by default against any Defendant other than Pamala Butler, Plaintiff submits no "proof of the facts constituting the claim" against any of them (see CPLR 3215[f].)
Plaintiff's motion is denied.

August 23, 2013___________________
Jack M. Battaglia
Justice, Supreme Court

Monday, September 16, 2013

PERPETRATORS OF NATIONWIDE FORECLOSURE RESCUE SCAM SENTENCED TO FEDERAL PRISON

PERPETRATORS OF NATIONWIDE FORECLOSURE RESCUE SCAM
SENTENCED TO FEDERAL PRISON

WASHINGTON, DC – Mark S. Farhood, 49, formerly of San Diego, Calif., and Jason S. Sant, 38, of Lecanto, Fla., were sentenced today for their roles in operating a nationwide online foreclosure rescue scam that went by various names, including Home Advocate Trustees and Walk Away Today, and used various websites, including walkawaytoday.org and sellfastusa.com, to deceive hundreds of vulnerable, distressed homeowners into surrendering their properties to the company.

Farhood was sentenced to 11 years in prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Sant was sentenced to 6 years in prison, followed by 2 years of supervised release. Each was also ordered to forfeit approximately $2 million in fraud proceeds to the government, along with various bank accounts and other assets.

Christy Romero, Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP); Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; and Valerie Parlave, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office, made the announcement today after sentencing by United States District Judge Anthony J. Trenga. Farhood and Sant each pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges on May 10, 2013.

“Farhood should spend the next 11 years in prison thinking about how he preyed on and cheated 389 distressed homeowners out of their homes by ‘buying’ their homes in fake sales for $10 per property andthen renting out the homes for $4 million, which he used to fund construction on his $1 million home in Costa Rica,” said Christy Romero, Special Inspector General for TARP (SIGTARP). “Farhood and his co-conspirator Sant, who was sentenced to six years in prison, hid their identities, stole identities of people whose pictures they found on the Internet, and exploited TARP’s housing program by submitting phony applications to stall foreclosures while they rented out the properties. When caught by SIGTARP and our law enforcement partners, Farhood tried to hide the proceeds of his crime, including the Costa Rica house and bags of silver coins, and tried have computer evidence of his crime deleted. SIGTARP will bring to justice all those who commit crimes exploiting the TARP bailout.”

According to court records, Farhood and Sant co-owned Home Advocate Trustees, which also went by the names Walk Away Today, First Equity Trustees, Home Security Consultants, Sell Fast USA, Short Sale Buyer, USA Sell House Fast, and USA Rental Housing. They marketed the businesses nationwide as purchasers of distressed real estate and a means by which vulnerable homeowners could avoid foreclosure and the accompanying negative effects on their credit. The companies told homeowners they were in the business of negotiating with lenders to purchase mortgage notes at a discount and falsely claimed to have been in business for seventeen years, to have experienced a 90% success rate in purchasing such notes, and to be the nation’s largest volume buyer of short sale and over-leveraged real estate.

As Sant and Farhood admitted in connection with their pleas, the businesses were a fraud, no such negotiations with lenders ever took place, and the scheme was merely a way for them to take possession of hundreds of residential properties, including homes within the Eastern District of Virginia, at virtually no cost and then reap millions of dollars in profits by renting the homes to unsuspecting tenants.

Farhood and Sant further admitted that as part of the scheme, they submitted fraudulent loan modification applications to mortgage lenders under the Treasury Department’s Making Home Affordable Program in the name of homeowners, without the homeowners’ knowledge or consent. Farhood and Sant used the fraudulent applications to stall foreclosures on the properties under their control and for which no mortgage payments were being made and to maximize the time period during which they could collect rental income.

The homes purportedly sold to Home Advocate Trustees and its related entities ended in foreclosure, harming the participating homeowners and commonly resulting in eviction of the tenants.This case was investigated by SIGTARP and the FBI’s Washington Field Office. Assistant United States Attorney Paul J. Nathanson prosecuted the case on behalf of the United States.This prosecution was brought in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, which was established to wage an aggressive and coordinated effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. SIGTARP is a member of the task force. 

To learn more about the President’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, please visit www.StopFraud.gov.

To report suspected illicit activity involving TARP, dial the SIGTARP Hotline: 
1-877-SIG-2009 (1-877-744-2009).


Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Foreclosure Negotiation Delays Said to Show Bad Faith

A judge has ordered that a woman be paid all interest costs, late fees and attorneys fees which accrued against her as her mortgage lender and loan servicer "egregiously" dragged out the settlement conferences designed to help her avoid foreclosure.

The U.S. Bank National Association and the Bank of America (BOA) flouted the requirement in CPLR 3408(f) that the parties involved in state-mandated foreclosure conferences negotiate in good faith, Bronx Supreme Court Justice Robert Torres (See Profile) concluded in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Shinaba, 381917-09.


Instead Torres described how Jumoke Shinaba experienced a 2 1/2-year ordeal beginning in December 2009 as 17 settlement conferences failed to produce a more affordable mortgage payment arrangement acceptable to both sides

Tuesday, August 13, 2013

Your mortgage documents are fake!

If you know about foreclosure fraud, the mass fabrication of mortgage documents in state courts by banks attempting to foreclose on homeowners, you may have one nagging question: Why did banks have to resort to this illegal scheme? Was it just cheaper to mock up the documents than to provide the real ones? Did banks figure they simply had enough power over regulators, politicians and the courts to get away with it? (They were probably right about that one.)
A newly unsealed lawsuit, which banks settled in 2012 for $95 million, actually offers a different reason, providing a key answer to one of the persistent riddles of the financial crisis and its aftermath. The lawsuit states that banks resorted to fake documents because they could not legally establish true ownership of the loans when trying to foreclose.
This reality, which banks did not contest but instead settled out of court, means that tens of millions of mortgages in America still lack a legitimate chain of ownership, with implications far into the future. And if Congress, supported by the Obama administration, goes back to the same housing finance system, with the same corrupt private entities who broke the nation’s private property system back in business packaging mortgages, then shame on all of us.
The 2011 lawsuit was filed in U.S. District Court in both North and South Carolina, by a white-collar fraud specialist named Lynn Szymoniak, on behalf of the federal government, 17 states and three cities. Twenty-eight banks, mortgage servicers and document processing companies are named in the lawsuit, including mega-banks like JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citi and Bank of America.
Szymoniak, who fell into foreclosure herself in 2009, researched her own mortgage documents and found massive fraud (for example, one document claimed that Deutsche Bank, listed as the owner of her mortgage, acquired ownership in October 2008, four months after they first filed for foreclosure). She eventually examined tens of thousands of documents, enough to piece together the entire scheme.
A mortgage has two parts: the promissory note (the IOU from the borrower to the lender) and the mortgage, which creates the lien on the home in case of default. During the housing bubble, banks bought loans from originators, and then (in a process known as securitization) enacted a series of transactions that would eventually pool thousands of mortgages into bonds, sold all over the world to public pension funds, state and municipal governments and other investors. A trustee would pool the loans and sell the securities to investors, and the investors would get an annual percentage yield on their money.
In order for the securitization to work, banks purchasing the mortgages had to physically convey the promissory note and the mortgage into the trust. The note had to be endorsed (the way an individual would endorse a check), and handed over to a document custodian for the trust, with a “mortgage assignment” confirming the transfer of ownership. And this had to be done before a 90-day cutoff date, with no grace period beyond that.
Georgetown Law professor Adam Levitin spelled this out in testimony before Congress in 2010: “If mortgages were not properly transferred in the securitization process, then mortgage-backed securities would in fact not be backed by any mortgages whatsoever.”
The lawsuit alleges that these notes, as well as the mortgage assignments, were “never delivered to the mortgage-backed securities trusts,” and that the trustees lied to the SEC and investors about this. As a result, the trusts could not establish ownership of the loan when they went to foreclose, forcing the production of a stream of false documents, signed by “robo-signers,” employees using a bevy of corporate titles for companies that never employed them, to sign documents about which they had little or no knowledge.
Many documents were forged (the suit provides evidence of the signature of one robo-signer, Linda Green, written eight different ways), some were signed by “officers” of companies that went bankrupt years earlier, and dozens of assignments listed as the owner of the loan “Bogus Assignee for Intervening Assignments,” clearly a template that was never changed. One defendant in the case, Lender Processing Services, created masses of false documents on behalf of the banks, often using fake corporate officer titles and forged signatures. This was all done to establish standing to foreclose in courts, which the banks otherwise could not.
Szymoniak stated in her lawsuit that, “Defendants used fraudulent mortgage assignments to conceal that over 1400 MBS trusts, each with mortgages valued at over $1 billion, are missing critical documents,” meaning that at least $1.4 trillion in mortgage-backed securities are, in fact, non-mortgage-backed securities. Because of the strict laws governing of these kinds of securitizations, there’s no way to make the assignments after the fact. Activists have a name for this: “securitization FAIL.”
One smoking gun piece of evidence in the lawsuit concerns a mortgage assignment dated Feb. 9, 2009, after the foreclosure of the mortgage in question was completed. According to the suit, “A typewritten note on the right hand side of the document states:  ‘This Assignment of Mortgage was inadvertently not recorded prior to the Final Judgment of Foreclosure… but is now being recorded to clear title.’”
This admission confirms that the mortgage assignment was not made before the closing date of the trust, invalidating ownership. The suit further argued that “the act of fabricating the assignments is evidence that the MBS Trust did not own the notes and/or the mortgage liens for some assets claimed to be in the pool.”
The federal government, states and cities joined the lawsuit under 25 counts of the federal False Claims Act and state-based versions of the law. All of them bought mortgage-backed securities from banks that never conveyed the mortgages or notes to the trusts. The plaintiffs argued that, considering that trustees and servicers had to spend lots of money forging and fabricating documents to establish ownership, they were materially harmed by the subsequent impaired value of the securities. Also, these investors (which includes the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve) paid for the transfer of mortgages to the trusts, yet they were never actually transferred.
Finally, the lawsuit argues that the federal government was harmed by “payments made on mortgage guarantees to Defendants lacking valid notes and assignments of mortgages who were not entitled to demand or receive said payments.”
Despite Szymoniak seeking a trial by jury, the government intervened in the case, and settled part of it at the beginning of 2012, extracting $95 million from the five biggest banks in the suit (Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citi and GMAC/Ally Bank). Szymoniak herself was awarded $18 million. But the underlying evidence was never revealed until the case was unsealed last Thursday.
Now that it’s unsealed, Szymoniak, as the named plaintiff, can go forward and prove the case. Along with her legal team (which includes the law firm of Grant & Eisenhoffer, which has recovered more money under the False Claims Act than any firm in the country), Szymoniak can pursue discovery and go to trial against the rest of the named defendants, including HSBC, the Bank of New York Mellon, Deutsche Bank and US Bank.
The expenses of the case, previously borne by the government, now are borne by Szymoniak and her team, but the percentages of recovery funds are also higher. “I’m really glad I was part of collecting this money for the government, and I’m looking forward to going through discovery and collecting the rest of it,” Szymoniak told Salon.
It’s good that the case remains active, because the $95 million settlement was a pittance compared to the enormity of the crime. By the end of 2009, private mortgage-backed securities trusts held one-third of all residential mortgages in the U.S. That means that tens of millions of home mortgages worth trillions of dollars have no legitimate underlying owner that can establish the right to foreclose. This hasn’t stopped banks from foreclosing anyway with false documents, and they are often successful, a testament to the breakdown of law in the judicial system. But to this day, the resulting chaos in disentangling ownership harms homeowners trying to sell these properties, as well as those trying to purchase them. And it renders some properties impossible to sell.
To this day, banks foreclose on borrowers using fraudulent mortgage assignments, a legacy of failing to prosecute this conduct and instead letting banks pay a fine to settle it. This disappoints Szymoniak, who told Salon the owner of these loans is now essentially “whoever lies the most convincingly and whoever gets the benefit of doubt from the judge.” Szymoniak used her share of the settlement to start the Housing Justice Foundation, a non-profit that attempts to raise awareness of the continuing corruption of the nation’s courts and land title system.
Most of official Washington, including President Obama, wants to wind down mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and return to a system where private lenders create securitization trusts, packaging pools of loans and selling them to investors. Government would provide a limited guarantee to investors against catastrophic losses, but the private banks would make the securities, to generate more capital for home loans and expand homeownership.
That’s despite the evidence we now have that, the last time banks tried this, they ignored the law, failed to convey the mortgages and notes to the trusts, and ripped off investors trying to cover their tracks, to say nothing of how they violated the due process rights of homeowners and stole their homes with fake documents.
The very same banks that created this criminal enterprise and legal quagmire would be in control again. Why should we view this in any way as a sound public policy, instead of a ticking time bomb that could once again throw the private property system, a bulwark of capitalism and indeed civilization itself, into utter disarray? As Lynn Szymoniak puts it, “The President’s calling for private equity to return. Why would we return to this?”
**Courtesy of www.salon.com ~click for full article.

Thursday, July 11, 2013

Judge Schack Refuses to be Silenced!

Judge Schack Refuses to be Silenced!

"Once again the ultimate defender of home owner rights steps up and gives the banks the beat down they deserve. The Judge is really vocal on this one! We have heard banks argue many times that JP Morgan Chase OWNS all of the old Washington Mutual loans that went through the FDIC.  We never bought it.  Leave it to Judge Schack to unearth the fact that  Chase never owned the notes – it only owned the servicing rights. However,  for almost two (2) years Chase's attorney(s) stood tall and said YES, we own the note and the mortgage. Then, in late 2011 Chase's attorney finally admitted they DID NOT OWN THE NOTE OR THE MORTGAGE -they only had servicing rights! How about that! Not only a waste of the court's time (and that of the borrower) but also a clear violation of CPLR Rule 3408 (f) BAD FAITH. Imagine that, a bank negotiating in bad faith. Bottom line - Don't mess with Judge Schack. Oh, did I fail to mention that the initial deposit by the borrower of $490,000, Judge Schack released $55,617.11 back to the borrower and declared the mortgage satisfied. How about that for justice???"

- John Brancato, Loss Mitigator
Robert E. Brown, PC





[*1]
JP Morgan Chase Bank, Natl. Assn. v Butler
2013 NY Slip Op 51050(U)
Decided on July 5, 2013
Supreme Court, Kings County
Schack, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 5, 2013
Supreme Court, Kings County


JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, AS PURCHASER OF THE LOANS AND OTHER ASSETS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (THE "SAVINGS BANK") FROM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ACTING AS RECEIVER FOR THE SAVINGS BANK AND PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ACT, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) 3415 Vinson Drive Columbus, OH 43219, Plaintiff,

against

Frederick Butler et. al., Defendants.



Plaintiff, JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS PURCHASER OF THE LOANS AND OTHER ASSETS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (THE "SAVINGS BANK") FROM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ACTING AS RECEIVER FOR THE SAVINGS BANK AND PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ACT, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) [CHASE], commenced the instant foreclosure action against defendant FREDERICK BUTLER [BUTLER], for the premises located at 325 Macon Street, Brooklyn, New York (Block 1847, Lot 49, County of Kings). After numerous CPLR Rule 3408 mandatory settlement conferences, first conducted by a Special Referee in the Foreclosure Settlement Part and then personally before me, the instant action for the foreclosure of the subject mortgage became moot, with the sale of the subject premises and the recording of a satisfaction by CHASE. The issue before the Court is the distribution of $490,000.00, deposited by defendant BUTLER with the Kings County Clerk, pursuant to my June 27, 2011 order authorizing the sale of the premises. This money is claimed by both CHASE and BUTLER. However, CHASE never owned the subject mortgage and note, despite asserting for almost two years that it did, and BUTLER never paid the balance due.


After numerous misrepresentations to the Court by various counsel for CHASE, it is clear that the actual BUTLER mortgage and note, given in 2007 by the defunct WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA [WAMU], was acquired in 2007 by the FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION [FANNIE MAE] from WAMU. Despite CHASE'S claims, before December 2011, to the Special Referee and the Court that it owned the subject mortgage and note, plaintiff CHASE only purchased the servicing rights to the subject mortgage and note from the FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION [FDIC] in September 2008, when WAMU was seized by the FDIC.
Plaintiff CHASE, as will be explained, never owned the subject BUTLER mortgage and note. Therefore, CHASE had no right to foreclose on the subject mortgage and note. Moreover, the continued subterfuge by CHASE and its counsel to the Special Referee and Court that it owned the subject BUTLER mortgage and note demonstrated "bad faith" in violation of CPLR Rule 3408 (f), which requires that "[b]oth the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible."

The Court has before it two orders to show cause by defendant BUTLER. The first order to show cause, dated October 26, 2011, seeks: the release, to defendant BUTLER, pursuant to [*2]CPLR Rule 2606, of the $490,000.00 deposited with the Kings County Clerk; reinstating defendant BUTLER's May 10, 2011 order to show cause which sought dismissal of the instant action with prejudice since plaintiff CHASE was not the holder of the subject promissory note; dismissing the action with prejudice, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211 (a) (1), (3), (7) and (8); sanctioning plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1; and, declaring the subject BUTLER note to be fully satisfied. Defendant BUTLER's second order to show cause, dated March 29, 2012, seeks leave to amend defendant's February 22, 2010-answer. Plaintiff CHASE, by an amended cross-motion, seeks the release, pursuant to CPLR Rule 2606, of the $490,000.00 deposited by defendant BUTLER with the Kings County Clerk, to plaintiff CHASE.

This case is troubling because various counsel for CHASE falsely claimed for almost two years, from January 20, 2010 until December 2011, that CHASE was the owner of the mortgage and note. Ultimately, in late 2011, after the subject mortgage had been satisfied, plaintiff CHASE's counsel admitted, in opposition to defendant BUTLER's October 26, 2011 order to show cause, that plaintiff CHASE did not own the BUTLER mortgage and note, but only the servicing rights to it. CHASE's counsel, in its opposition papers, submitted an affidavit, dated December 9, 2011, from Greg De Castro, "Director-Servicing Management" of FANNIE MAE, claiming that FANNIE MAE acquired from WAMU the BUTLER Mortgage and Note and "Chase is the servicer of the loan." Further, Mr. De Castro makes the ludicrous claim, in violation of New York law, that "[a]s Fannie Mae's servicer, CHASE has authority to commence a foreclosure action on the Loan and to receive and/or collect the proceeds from the sale of the Property."

For reasons to be explained, in applying the Court's equitable powers, the Court grants the October 26, 2011 order to show cause of defendant BUTLER to the extent that: the Kings County Clerk shall release to defendant BUTLER $55,617.11 from the $490,000.00 deposited with the Kings County Clerk; the Court's declares that the subject BUTLER Note is fully satisfied; and a hearing shall be conducted to (1) determine whether CHASE or FANNIE MAE is entitled to the balance of $434,382.89 deposited with the Kings County Clerk, pursuant to my order and, (2) to give CHASE and its counsel an opportunity to be heard as to whether or not they engaged in frivolous conduct, in violation of 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, and if so should CHASE and/or its counsel pay any costs and sanctions. The March 29, 2012 order to show cause of defendant BUTLER is denied as moot. The amended cross-motion of plaintiff CHASE for the release of the $490,000.00 deposited with the Kings County Clerk, to plaintiff CHASE, is denied.
Background

Defendant's parents, William Butler and Louisa Butler, purchased the subject premises in 1966 (Reel 224, Page 471 of the New York City Register for Kings County). On July 12, 2002, the subject premises were deeded to defendant BUTLER by Louisa Butler, the surviving spouse of William Butler (Reel 5727, Page 1870 of the New York City Register for Kings County). Defendant BUTLER, on January 30, 2007, refinanced his home by executing a note and mortgage with WAMU for $450,000.00, recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at CRFN 2007000123607, on March 7, 2007. Also, on January 30, 2007, Mr. Butler received a home equity line of credit with WAMU, recorded in the Office of the New York City Register, at CRFN 2007000123608, on March 7, 2007. [*3]

The Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) does not show any assignments of the WAMU mortgage to FANNIE MAE or CHASE. However, a CHASE representative, Yvonne Brooks, "Home Loan Senior Research Specialist," in her December 8, 2011-affidavit attached to plaintiff's cross-motion, claims, in ¶ 6, that FANNIE MAE, in April 2007, purchased the BUTLER loan and WAMU retained the servicing rights. Exhibit D of the cross-motion contains a computer printout, dated April 20, 2007, showing this. Thus, plaintiff CHASE ultimately acknowledged that FANNIE MAE is the "Wizard of Oz," operating behind the curtain, and the real owner of the subject BUTLER note and mortgage.

In 2008 there was a dispute between WAMU and defendant BUTLER about a $10.00 late payment on BUTLER's home equity line of credit. According to defendant BUTLER, WAMU ultimately acknowledged its error and promised defendant BUTLER that the error would be promptly corrected. However, in the interim, WAMU had defendant BUTLER's home equity line of credit rescinded and injured his credit rating by reporting erroneous information to credit bureaus.


Then, on September 24, 2008, WAMU failed and its deposits and assets were seized by the federal government. On September 25, 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision, a now-defunct federal agency, named the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corp. (FDIC) as Receiver for WAMU. WAMU had not corrected its errors by re-instituting Butler's line of credit and correcting the erroneous reporting to credit bureaus before it was seized by the FDIC. CHASE, despite its assertions to the contrary for almost two years in the instant action, purchased the servicing rights to WAMU's mortgages and notes, not the actual mortgages and notes.


In a letter, dated October 10, 2008, CHASE advised BUTLER that WAMU was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the FDIC was named Receiver. It then states that CHASE "acquired certain assets of Washington Mutual Bank from the FDIC, including the right to service your loan."

Plaintiff CHASE's counsel, then Steven J. Baum, P.C., commenced the instant foreclosure action on the subject premises, with the filing of a summons, complaint and notice of pendency on January 20, 2010. In the first paragraph of the complaint, Steven J. Baum, P.C., "alleges upon information and belief" that plaintiff CHASE is "the owner and holder of a note and mortgage being foreclosed."

After plaintiff CHASE filed a Request for Judicial Intervention, an initial CPLR Rule 3408 mandatory settlement conference was held on March 22, 2010, followed by at least nine additional conferences, before Special Referee Deborah Goldstein. Defendant BUTLER appeared pro se except for the last conference, when he was represented by Yolande I. Nicholson, Esq. At the conclusion of the April 7, 2011-settlement conference, Special Referee Goldstein ordered that "Plaintiff is directed to appear by Sarah Feor, the attorney of Baum with knowledge of the standing and litigation issues. Production of all title and ownership documentation, including the note and all assignments are required to be produced in accordance with [CPLR] 3408 (e) at the next conference on 4/11/11 and Sarah Feor, Esq. must appear with a Chase rep."

In her April 14, 2011 order, Special Referee Goldstein noted that plaintiff Chase and its counsel "failed to abide by my last directive requiring a Chase representative to be present with a [*4]copy of the Note. In addition, Plaintiff appeared by two different law firms, Baum and Cullen & Dykman LLP, and they cannot agree on who is authorized to appear and negotiate on behalf of Chase." Moreover, Special Referee Goldstein noted that the payoff letters provided by CHASE's counsel included attorneys' fees for settlement conferences. Therefore, Special Referee Goldstein required plaintiff to provide defense "with a clear payoff reflecting only principal and capitalized arrears on or before 4/21/11," and to "produce a copy of the Note and all documents reflecting the transfer of title from WAMU to Chase at the next conference on 5/2/11."

The next conference was held before me on May 2, 2011. Counsel were present from both Baum and Cullen & Dykman for plaintiff, as well as counsel for defendant. CHASE'S new counsel, Cullen & Dykman, finally presented to the Court for its inspection the original note to WAMU executed by BUTLER. Plaintiff's counsel from both Baum and Cullen & Dykman represented to the Court that CHASE was the holder of the note. However, the WAMU note was not endorsed by the FDIC as Receiver or any other entity and ACRIS does not show any assignment of the mortgage. The conference did not result in a settlement.

Several days later, defendant BUTLER received in his home mailbox from the Baum law firm a J. P. Morgan Payment History on his loan, No. 3012577379, for the subject premises. The computerized printout received by defendant BUTLER states that there was full settlement on "5/22/10" and that the loan was "REMOVED LOSS MITIGATION." The printout shows that on "5-22-10" a transaction for "$454,337.35" took place, of which "$434,382.89" is listed as "PRINCIPAL" and "$19,954.46" is listed as "INTEREST." This is no reference as to who paid the $454,337.35. Sarah Feor, Esq., then of the Baum firm, in her December 12, 2011 affirmation attached to plaintiff's cross-motion, states, in ¶ 28:

On or about April 29, 2011, our office [Baum's] received the
previously requested loan payment history from Plaintiff. As the borrower
was previously appearing pro se and had only recently retained counsel,
the payment history was inadvertently [emphasis added] sent to the
Defendant directly by a legal assistant from Plaintiff's counsel office.
The loan history was sent in an effort to comply with a prior directive of
Referee Goldstein.

Defendant's counsel, as a result of this payment history, moved by an order to show cause, dated May 10, 2011, for, among other things: dismissal of the instant action based upon plaintiff's lack of good faith in that "plaintiff had received payment on May 22, 2010 for the amount specified" as owing in the complaint [$434,382.89]; and, awarding costs and sanctions against plaintiff because "plaintiff withheld material information, including the May 22, 2010 payment from the Court." In the May 10, 2011 order to show cause, I directed plaintiff to provide the Court with detailed information as to "the entity or third party that made the payment to it on May 22, 2010 that is specified in the payment history it delivered to defendant on May 4, 2011 . . . which payment resulted in plaintiff marking its loan payment history records fully settled,' in its opposition papers to be filed and served by June 13, 2011." Plaintiff failed to comply with this order and at the June 27, 2011 hearing before me made an application to extend the time to identify the May 22, 2010 payor. I denied this request.

In my June 27, 2011 decision and order, I granted defendant BUTLER's May 10, 2011 order to show cause to the extent that he could close on a long-sale of the subject premises and deposit [*5]$490,000.00 of the proceeds with the Kings County Clerk, pursuant to the CPLR § 1006 (g). Further, I directed that a certified copy of this order be filed with the City Register and that at the closing on the sale of the subject premises the title company could accept no proceeds on behalf of plaintiff CHASE. The parties could then move for distribution of the $490,000.00 deposited with the Kings County Clerk, after the closing of title on the subject premises.

The closing on the sale of the subject premises, for $839,000.00, took place on July 18, 2011. $490,000.00, pursuant to my order, was deposited with Kings County Clerk on that day. As per my June 27, 2011 order, CHASE issued a satisfaction of the subject BUTLER mortgage on September 7, 2011 and recorded it on September 26, 2011, in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, at CRFN 2011000340485
In her August 25, 2011 order, Special Referee Goldstein referred the instant action back "to Part 27 for all purposes when they [the parties] reached an impasse regarding production of the original note."

The parties then made the orders to show cause and cross-motion now pending before the Court. Cullen & Dykman, in its opposition to defendant's instant order to show cause and in support of its cross-motion for the release of the $490,000.00 deposited with the Kings County Clerk to plaintiff CHASE, asserts that CHASE is entitled to receive the funds, on page 2 of its December 9, 2011-memorandum of law because "Chase, the servicer of the loan made by Washington Mutual Bank, N.A. andnow owned by Fannie Mae, is the designated entity to collect and receive the pay-off funds to satisfy the mortgage on the Property." In his December 9, 2011-affidavit, Greg De Castro, "Director-Servicing Management," for FANNIE MAE states, in ¶ 3, that "Fannie Mae acquired from Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. . . . ownership of the loan executed by Frederick Butler in the principal amount of $450,000.00 which is secured by a lien on the Property . . . Chase is the servicer of the Loan." Further, in ¶ 5, Mr. De Castro claims that "[a]s Fannie Mae's servicer, CHASE has authority to commence a foreclosure action on the Loan and to receive and/or collect the proceeds from the sale."CHASE, Mr. De Castro and FANNIE MAE must be unaware that in New York "[t]o establish a prima facie case in an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the mortgage and mortgage note, ownership of the mortgage, and the defendant's default in payment [emphasis added]." (Campaign v Barba, 23 AD3d 327 [2d Dept 2005]). Further, "foreclosure of a mortgage may not be brought by one who has no title to it." (Kluge v Fugazy, 145 AD2d 537, 538 [2d Dept 1988]). Moreover, "[p]laintiff's attempt to foreclose upon a mortgage in which he had no legal or equitable interest was without foundation in law or fact." (Katz v East-Ville Realty Co., 249 AD2d 243 [1d Dept 1998]). It is clear, that after almost two years of its bad faith assertions to the contrary, CHASE never owned the subject mortgage and note. Therefore, CHASE lacks authority to be the plaintiff in the instant action. "The foreclosure of a mortgage cannot be pursued by one who has no demonstrated right to the debt." (Bank of New York v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 280 [2d Dept 2011]).

Yvonne Brooks, CHASE's Home Loan Senior Research Specialist, in her December 8, 2011-affidavit, admits, in ¶ 6, that FANNIE MAE, in April 2007 "purchased the loan from Washington Mutual . . . However, Washington Mutual retained the servicing rights." Then, Ms. Brooks, in ¶ 7 of her affidavit, states that on September 25, 2008 WAMU was placed into [*6]receivership by the FDIC and CHASE purchased certain assets, "including mortgage servicing rights." She then states, in ¶ 8, "[d]ue to the Chase's purchase of Washington Mutual's servicing rights, Chase took over the servicing obligations of the Loan."

Ms. Brooks, in ¶ 13 of her affidavit, alleges that the Fannie Mae 2006 Servicing Guide, VIII, 102, "Initiation of Foreclosure Proceedings [exhibit H of cross-motion]," allows CHASE to be the plaintiff in the instant action. A reading of this FANNIE MAE regulation demonstrates the lengths to which FANNIE MAE evaded its responsibility to be the real plaintiff in interest in the instant action or other foreclosure proceedings. It demonstrates the "unclean hands" of FANNIE MAE and its servicer, CHASE. It is FANNIE MAE'S roadmap of how to inveigle and deceive a court. This FANNIE MAE regulation states, in relevant part:

Fannie Mae is at all times the owner of the mortgage note, whether
the note is in our portfolio or whether we own it as trustee for an MBS trust.
In addition, Fannie Mae at all times has possession of and is the holder of
the mortgage note, except in the limited circumstances expressly described
below. We may have direct possession of the note or a custodian may have custody of the note for us. If we possess the note through a document
custodian, the document custodian has custody of the note for our exclusive
use and benefit.

In most cases, a servicer will have a copy of the mortgage note that
it can use to begin the foreclosure process. However, some jurisdictions
require that the servicer produce the original note before or shortly after
initiating foreclosure proceedings. If our possession of the note is direct
because the custody documents are at our document delivery facility, to
obtain the note or any other custody documents that are needed, the servicer
should submit a request to our Custody Department . . . the servicer should
specify whether the original note is required or whether the request if for
a copy.

In some jurisdictions, only the "holder" of the note may conduct a
foreclosure. In any jurisdiction in which our servicer must be the holder
of the note in order to conduct the foreclosure, we temporarily transfer
our possession of the note to our servicer, effective automatically and
immediately before commencement of the foreclosure proceeding. When
we transfer our possession, our servicer becomes the holder of the note
during the foreclosure proceedings. If the borrower reinstates the loan or
the servicer ceases to service the loan for Fannie Mae for any reason, then
possession of the note at that time automatically reverts to Fannie Mae and
the note must be returned to the document custodian. At that time, Fannie
Mae also resumes being the holder, just as it was before the foreclosure
proceedings. The transfer of our possession, and any reversion of
possession to us are evidenced and memorialized by our publication of
this paragraph. This Guide provision may be relied upon by a court to
establish that the servicer conducting the foreclosure proceeding has
possession, and is the holder, of the note during the foreclosure proceeding, [*7]
unless the court is otherwise notified by Fannie Mae. [Emphasis added]."

Thus, it appears to the Court that the delay by CHASE in producing the subject BUTLER Note was to give Baum and/or Cullen & Dykman ample time to temporarily borrow the BUTLER Note from FANNIE MAE for its May 2, 2011 presentation to the Court. Despite its December 2011 admission that FANNIE MAE owned the subject BUTLER mortgage and note, CHASE, prior to this, continuously presented its ownership subterfuge to Special Referee Goldstein and the Court. The Court cannot countenance the deceptive behavior of CHASE, the alleged owner of the subject BUTLER mortgage and note, its counsel, and FANNIE MAE, the real owner of the subject BUTLER mortgage and note. FANNIE MAE's Servicing Guide, with its deceptive practices to fool courts, does not supercede New York law.

Further, Ms. Brooks explains the May 22, 2010 transaction, in ¶ 14 of her affidavit, as "an automatic cashless Fannie Mae transaction . . . which reclassifed the loan from being a schedule/schedule loan to an actual actual/actual remittance loan mortgage. See Fannie Mae 2006 Servicing Guide I, 208.06: Reclassification of Certain MBS Pool Mortgages attached hereto as Exhibit "H [sic]." This regulation, in its version of Orwellian Nineteen Eighty-Four "Newspeak," states:

Rather than requiring the servicer to repurchase certain delinquent
MBS pool mortgages that are serviced under the special servicing option -
those for which we have the entire foreclosure loss risk and those for
which Fannie Mae and the servicer share the foreclosure loss risk with
Fannie Mae having the responsibility for marketing the acquired property -
we will automatically reclassify a mortgage that satisfies our selection
criteria as an "actual/actual" remittance type portfolio mortgage. Generally,
we will select mortgages that have at least three payments past due for
reclassification in the month when the fourth payment is delinquent. 

Ms. Brooks, based upon the reclassification of the Butler mortgage, alleges in ¶ 16 of her affidavit, that the BUTLER loan "reclassification presents as FULL SETTLEMENT 5/22/10' on defendant's loan history and does not represent a payment [exhibit G of cross-motion]."

Discussion

In analyzing the instant orders to show cause and cross-motion, the Court is cognizant that, with the sale of the subject premises and the $490,000.00 of the proceeds deposited with the Kings County Clerk, the instant BUTLER foreclosure action is now moot. However, the Court must deal with the aftermath, namely: the issue of bad faith by CHASE, its counsel and FANNIE Mae; the distribution of the $490,000.00 on deposit with the Kings County Clerk; and, whether the bad faith by CHASE and its counsel is frivolous conduct.


"A foreclosure action is equitable in nature and triggers the equitable powers of the court (see Notey v Darien Constr. Corp., 41 NY2d 1055, 1055-1056 [1977]). Once equity is invoked, the court's power is as broad as equity and justice require.' (Norstar Bank v Morabito, 201 AD2d 545 [2d Dept 1994])." (Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Horkan (68 AD3d 948 [2d Dept 2009]). (See Jamaica Sav. Bank v M.S. Inv. Co., 274 NY 215 [1937]). "Since it is the plaintiff lender who seeks equitable relief from this court, the onus is upon the lender to satisfy the requisites of equity and come to this court with clean hands.' (Junkersfeld v Bank of Manhattan Co., 250 App Div 646 [ld Dept 1937].)" (M & [*8]T Mtge. Corp. v Foy, 20 Misc 3d 274, fn 1 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2008]). (See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Hughes, 27 Misc 3d 628, 634 [Sup Ct, Erie County 2010]). 

A principal of equity is that "[a] wrongdoer should not be permitted to profit from his or her wrong (see Kirschner v KMPG LLP, 15 NY3d 446, 464 [2010]; Campbell v Thomas, 73 AD3d 103, 116-117 [2d Dept 2010]; Beaumont v American Can Co., 215 AD3d 249 [1d Dept 1995])." (Norwest Bank Minn. N.A. v E.M.V. Realty Corp., 84 AD3d 835, 836 [2d Dept 2012]).


CHASE, in the instant action, committed a fraud upon the Court by claiming to be the plaintiff. FANNIE MAE should have been the plaintiff as the owner of the note and mortgage when the BUTLER foreclosure action commenced. Thus, CHASE went to numerous CPLR Rule 3408 mandatory settlement conferences with unclean hands, falsely alleging that it was the plaintiff owner of the BUTLER mortgage and note. Recently, the Court in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers (___ AD3d ___, 2013 NY Slip Op 03085 at

* 1-2 [2d Dept, May 1, 2013]) instructed:

CPLR 3408 provides for mandatory settlement conferences in
certain residential foreclosure actions (see former CPLR 3408). In 2009,
shortly after the passage of the Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure
Laws, the Legislature amended a number of the recently enacted statutes,
including CPLR 3408 (see L 2009, ch 507). The purposes of the
amendments were to allow more homeowners at risk of foreclosure
to benefit from consumer protection laws and opportunities to prevent
foreclosure; to establish certain requirements for plaintiffs in foreclosure
actions obligating them to maintain the subject properties; to establish
protections for tenants living in foreclosed properties; and to strengthen
consumer protections aimed at defeating "rescue scams" (Governor's
Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2009, ch 507, at 5). The 2009 amendments include
a provision requiring that "[b]oth the plaintiff and defendant shall
negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution,
including a loan modification, if possible" (CPLR 3408 [f]).
While CPLR 3408 (f) requires the parties at a settlement
conference to negotiate in good faith, that section "does not set forth
any specific remedy for a party's failure" to do so (Hon. Mark C.
Dillon, The Newly-Enacted CPLR 3408 for Easing the Mortgage
Foreclosure Crisis: Very Good Steps, but not Legislatively Perfect,
30 Pace L. Rev 855 at 875 [2010]).
The Chief Administrator for the Courts promulgated 22 NYCRR 202.12-a, the rules for CPLR Rule 3408 mandatory settlement conferences. 22 NYCRR 202.12-a (c) (4) provides that: [*9]
The parties shall engage in settlement discussions in good faith
to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification
if possible. The court shall ensure that each party fulfills its obligation
to negotiate in good faith and shall see that conferences not be unduly
delayed or subject to willful dilatory tactics so that the rights of both
parties may be adjudicated in a timely manner.
In HSBC Bank, USA v McKenna (37 Misc 2d 885, 905-906 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2012]), the Court provides a lengthy discussion as to the meaning of "good faith," finding:
Generally, "good faith" under New York law is a subjective
concept, "necessitat[ing] examination of a state of mind." (See Credit
487 [1d Dept 2011], quoting Coan v Estate of Chapin, 156 AD2d 318,
319 [1d Dept 1989]). "Good Faith" is an intangible and abstract quality
with no technical meaning or statutory definition." (Adler v 720 Park
Ave. Corp., 87 AD2d 514, 515 [1d Dept 1982], quoting Doyle v
Gordon, 158 NYS 2d 248, 249 [Sup Ct, New York County 1954]).
"It encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage." (Doyle v Gordon, 158 NYS2d at 259-160; see also UCC
1-201 [19] ["Good Faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."] "Good faith is . . . lacking when there is a
failure to deal honestly, fairly, and openly." (Matter of CIT Group/
Commerical Servc., Inc. v 160-09 Jamaica Ave. Ltd. Partnership,
25 AD3d 301, 303 [1d Dept 2006] [internal quotation marks and
citation omitted]; see also Southern Indus. v Jeremias, 166 AD2d 178,
183 [2d Dept 1978]). "In New York, as elsewhere, good faith'
connotes an actual state of mind—a state of mind motivated by
proper motive." Plotti v Fleming, 277 Fed 864, 868 [2d Cir 1960]).
In the context of negotiations, the absence of agreement does not itself
establish the lack of good faith. (See Brookfield Indus. v Goldman,
87 AD2d, 752, 753 [1d Dept 1982]). [*10]Usually, a finding of lack of good faith in CPLR Rule 3408 settlement conferences has been determined from the conduct of the mortgagee/plaintiff. "Conduct such as providing conflicting information, refusal to honor agreements, unexcused delay, unexplained charges, and misrepresentations have been held to constitute "bad faith." (Flagstar Bank, FSB v Walker, 37 Misc 3d 312, 318 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2012]). (See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Ruggiero, 39 Misc 3d 1233 (A), at * 6 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2013]; One W. Bank, FSB v Greenhut, 36 Misc 3d 1205 (A), at * 4-5 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2012]). In the instant action, it is obvious that plaintiff CHASE and its counsel provided conflicting information, unexplained charges and misrepresentations. Clearly, CHASE and its counsel engaged in bad faith, with its "failure to deal honestly, fairly, and openly."

The Appellate Division, Second Department, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers at * 7, discussed the remedies that courts may use if foreclosure plaintiffs violated their obligation, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3408 (f), to negotiate in good faith. The Court observed:
In the absence of specific guidance from the Legislature or the
Chief Administrator of the Courts as to the appropriate sanctions or
remedies to be employed where a party is found to have violated its
obligation to negotiate in good faith pursuant to CPLR 3408 (f), the
courts have resorted to a variety of alternatives in an effort to enforce
the statutory mandate to negotiate in good faith. For example, upon
finding that foreclosing plaintiffs have failed to negotiate in good faith,
courts have barred them from collecting interest, legal fees, and expenses
County 2012]; BAC Home Loans v Westervelt, 29 Misc 3d 1224 [A]
[Sup Ct., Dutchess County 2010]; . . . Wells Fargo Bank v Hughes,
27 Misc 3d 628 [Sup Ct., Erie County 2010] . . . [and] imposed a
monetary sanction pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 130 (see Deutsche
Bank Trust Co. of Am. v Davis, 32 Misc 3d 1210 [A] [Sup Ct, Kings

County 2011]; cf. BAC Home Loans v Westervelt, 29 Misc 3d 1224. 

Further, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers at * 9, the Court instructed:


In the absence of a specifically authorized sanction or remedy in the
statutory scheme, the courts must employ appropriate, permissible,
and authorized remedies, tailored to the circumstances of each given
case. What may prove appropriate recourse in one case may be
inappropriate or unauthorized under the circumstances presented in
another. Accordingly, in the absence of further guidance from the
Legislature or the Chief Administrator of the Courts, the courts must
prudently and carefully select among available and authorized remedies,tailoring their application to the circumstances of the case. [*11]

Therefore, in the instant action, the Court has tailored an equitable remedy to the particular circumstances of the BUTLER foreclosure action, that will determine how the $490,000.00 on deposit with the Kings County Clerk will be distributed. According to the CHASE or FANNIE MAE computerized printout sent to defendant BUTLER, in May 2011, there was full settlement of the BUTLER loan on "5/22/10," with the loan "REMOVED LOSS MITIGATION." The printout shows that on "5-22-10" a transaction for "$454,337.35" took place, of which "$434,382.89" is listed as "PRINCIPAL" and "$19,954.46" is listed as "INTEREST." This is no reference as to who paid the $454,337.35. Therefore, a hearing shall be held to determine whether CHASE, FANNIE MAE or any other entity is entitled to the $434,382.89 settlement of the BUTLER loan. Since CHASE failed to negotiate in good faith, not admitting until December 2011 that FANNIE MAE was the real plaintiff, and numerous CPLR Rule 3408 mandatory settlement conferences were conducted before Special Referee Goldstein and myself, CHASE is barred from collecting interest, legal fees, and expenses after May 22, 2010. (See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers at * 7; Bank of Am., N.A. v Lucido, supra; BAC Home Loans v Westervelt, supra; Wells Fargo Bank v Hughes, supra.). $55,617.11, the balance of the $490,000.00 on deposit with the Kings County Clerk, will be distributed to defendant BUTLER. This remedy is necessitated by the bad faith of CHASE in this action. This Court will follow the observations of the Court in Bank of Am., N.A. v Lucido, at * 6, that:

equity will not intervene on behalf of one who acts in an unjust,
unconscionable or egregious manner, York v Searles, 97 AD331
[2d Dept 1907], aff'd 189 NY 573 [1907]). This Court cannot, and will
not, countenance a lack of good faith in the proceedings that are brought
before it, especially where blatant and repeated misrepresentations of
fact are advanced, neither will it permit equitable relief to lie in favor

of one who so flagrantly demonstrates such obvious bad faith. Further, the Court needs to determine if the bad faith of CHASE and its counsel, Cullen & Dykman is frivolous conduct. 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (a) states that "the Court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in this Part, which shall be payable as provided in section 130-1.3 of this Subpart." Further, it states in 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (b), that "sanctions may be imposed upon any attorney appearing in the action or upon a partnership, firm or corporation with which the attorney is associated." 

22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(c) states that:

For purposes of this part, conduct is frivolous if:

(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported

by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or

reversal of existing law; 

(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of


the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or 

(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false. 

It is clear that CHASE's representations that it was the plaintiff in the instant action "is [*12]completely without merit in law" and "asserts material factual statements that are false."


Several years before the drafting and implementation of the Part 130 Rules for costs and sanctions, the Court of Appeals (A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 6 [1986]) observed that "frivolous litigation is so serious a problem affecting the proper administration of justice, the courts may proscribe such conduct and impose sanctions in this exercise of their rule-making powers, in the absence of legislation to the contrary (see NY Const, art VI, § 30, Judiciary Law § 211 [1] [b])."

Part 130 Rules were subsequently created, effective January 1, 1989, to give the courts an additional remedy to deal with frivolous conduct, along with Appellate Division disciplinary case law against attorneys for abuse of process or malicious prosecution. The Court, in Gordon v Marrone (202 AD2d 104, 110 [2d Dept 1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 813 [1995]), instructed that: 

Conduct is frivolous and can be sanctioned under the court rule if 

it is completely without merit . . . and cannot be supported by a 

reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 

existing law; or . . . it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong 

the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure 

another" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c] [1], [2] . . . ).



In Levy v Carol Management Corporation (260 AD2d 27, 33 [1st Dept 1999]) the Court stated that in determining if sanctions are appropriate the Court must look at the broad pattern of conduct by the offending attorneys or parties. Further, "22 NYCRR 130-1.1 allows us to exercise our discretion to impose costs and sanctions on an errant party . . ." Levy at 34, held that "[s]anctions are retributive, in that they punish past conduct. They also are goal oriented, in that they are useful in deterring future frivolous conduct not only by the particular parties, but also by the Bar at large."


The Court, in Kernisan, M.D. v Taylor (171 AD2d 869 [2d Dept 1991]), noted that the intent of the Part 130 Rules "is to prevent the waste of judicial resources and to deter vexatious litigation and dilatory or malicious litigation tactics (cf. Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Church of City of New York v 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d 411; see Steiner v Bonhamer, 146 Misc 2d 10) [Emphasis added]." The instant action, with CHASE, the improper plaintiff, engaging in bad faith is "a waste of judicial resources." 

This conduct, as noted in Levy, must be deterred. In Weinstock v Weinstock (253 AD2d 873 [2d Dept 1998]), the Court ordered the maximum sanction of $10,000.00 for an attorney who pursued an appeal "completely without merit," and holding, at 874, that "[w]e therefore award the maximum authorized amount as a sanction for this conduct (see, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1) calling to mind that frivolous litigation causes a substantial waste of judicial resources to the detriment of those litigants who come to the Court with real grievances [Emphasis added]." Citing Weinstock, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Bernadette Panzella, P.C. v De Santis (36 AD3d 734 [2d Dept 2007]), affirmed a Supreme Court, Richmond County $2,500.00 sanction, at 736, as "appropriate in view of the plaintiff's waste of judicial resources [Emphasis added]." [*13]


In Navin v Mosquera (30 AD3d 883 [3d Dept 2006]), the Court instructed that when considering if specific conduct is sanctionable as frivolous, "courts are required to examine whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent [or] should have been apparent' (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c])." The Court, in Sakow ex rel. Columbia Bagel, Inc. v Columbia Bagel, Inc. (6 Misc 3d 939, 943 [Sup Ct, New York County 2004]), held that "[i]n assessing whether to award sanctions, the Court must consider whether the attorney adhered to the standards of a reasonable attorney (Principe v Assay Partners, 154 Misc 2d 702 [Sup Ct, NY County 1992])."

Therefore, the Court will examine the conduct of plaintiff CHASE and plaintiff's counsel, in a hearing, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, to determine if plaintiff CHASE and plaintiff's present counsel, Jennean Rogers, Esq. and her firm, Cullen & Dykman LLP engaged in frivolous conduct, and to allow plaintiff CHASE and plaintiff's present counsel, Jennean Rogers, Esq. and her firm, Cullen & Dykman LLP a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
Conclusion


Accordingly, it is


ORDERED, that the order to show cause of defendant FREDERICK BUTLER, dated October 26, 2011, is granted to the extent that: the Kings County Clerk shall release to defendant FREDERICK BUTLER $55,617.11, made payable to him, from the $490,000.00 deposited with the Kings County Clerk; the Court's declares that the subject BUTLER Note is fully satisfied; and a hearing shall be conducted to (1) determine whether plaintiff JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS PURCHASER OF THE LOANS AND OTHER ASSETS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (THE "SAVINGS BANK") FROM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ACTING AS RECEIVER FOR THE SAVINGS BANK AND PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ACT, 12 
U.S.C. § 1821 (d) or the FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION is entitled to the balance of $434,382.89 deposited with the Kings County Clerk, pursuant to my June 27, 2011 decision and order and, (2) to give plaintiff JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS PURCHASER OF THE LOANS AND OTHER ASSETS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (THE "SAVINGS BANK") FROM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ACTING AS RECEIVER FOR THE SAVINGS BANK AND PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ACT, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) and its present counsel, Jennean Rogers, Esq. and her firm, CULLEN & DYKMAN LLP an opportunity to be heard as to whether or not they engaged in frivolous conduct, in violation of 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, and if so should plaintiff JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS PURCHASER OF THE LOANS AND OTHER ASSETS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (THE "SAVINGS BANK") FROM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ACTING AS RECEIVER FOR THE SAVINGS BANK AND PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ACT, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) [*14]and/or its present counsel, Jennean Rogers, Esq. and her firm, CULLEN & DYKMAN LLP pay any costs and sanctions; and it is further



ORDERED, that the order to show cause of defendant FREDERICK BUTLER, dated March 29, 2012, is denied as moot; and it is further


ORDERED, that the amended cross-motion of plaintiff JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS PURCHASER OF THE LOANS AND OTHER ASSETS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (THE "SAVINGS BANK") FROM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ACTING AS RECEIVER FOR THE SAVINGS BANK AND PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ACT, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d), for the release of the $490,000.00 deposited with the Kings County Clerk, to plaintiff JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS PURCHASER OF THE LOANS AND OTHER ASSETS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (THE "SAVINGS BANK") FROM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ACTING AS RECEIVER FOR THE SAVINGS BANK AND PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ACT, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d), is denied; and it is further


ORDERED, that: (1) to determine the distribution of the $434,832.89 balance on deposit with the Kings County Clerk; and (2) it appearing that plaintiff JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS PURCHASER OF THE LOANS AND OTHER ASSETS OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA (THE "SAVINGS BANK") FROM THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ACTING AS RECEIVER FOR THE SAVINGS BANK AND PURSUANT TO ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE ACT, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d), plaintiff's present counsel Jennean Rogers, Esq. and her firm, CULLEN & DYKMAN LLP engaged in "frivolous conduct," as defined in the Rules of the Chief Administrator, 22 NYCRR § 130-1 (c), and that pursuant to the Rules of the Chief Administrator, 22 NYCRR § 130.1.1 (d), "[a]n award of costs or the imposition of sanctions may be made . . . upon the court's own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to be heard"; this Court will conduct a hearing in Part 27, on Thursday, September 12, 2013, at 2:30 P.M., in Room 277, 360 Adams Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201; and it is further


ORDERED, that Ronald David Bratt, Esq., my Principal Law Clerk, is directed to serve this order by first-class mail, upon: Jamie Dimon, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of plaintiff, JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 270 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017; Jennean Rogers, Esq., CULLEN & DYKMAN LLP, 100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Garden City, New York 11530; CULLEN & DYKMAN LLP, 100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Garden City, New York 11530; and Yolande I. Nicholson, Esq., 26 Court Street, Suite 602, Brooklyn, New York 11242.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. [*15]
ENTER